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I. INTRODUCTION
No good deed goes unpunished.'
In recent years, federal and state laws have sought to promote
good corporate citizenship by encouraging business entities to estab-
lish internal compliance programs designed to avoid-or at least de-
tect-illicit conduct.2 The most significant impetus toward effective
internal corporate policing occurred in 1991, when the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines) made the existence of
an "effective" internal compliance program the sine qua non for
receiving leniency upon conviction.3 As a result, corporations na-
1. Moliere, The Misanthrope, in Plays by Moliere 177 (Random House, 1983).
2. Several federal agencies encourage companies to establish internal compliance pro-
grams. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,
102 Stat. 4677, 4680 (stating that broker-dealers and investment advisors must establish,
maintain, and enforce internal compliance programs to prevent illegal insider trading);
Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60
Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995) (EPA policy statement concerning treatment of internal audit
materials); Safety and Health Program Management Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 3904, 3913 (1989)
(Department of Labor guidelines addressing compliance audits); Factors in Decisions on
Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary
Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by the Violator (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1991) ("Justice
Department Factors"); Evelyn E. C. Queen, Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, in Margaret P.
Spencer and Ronald R. Sims, eds., Corporate Misconduct: The Legal, Societal, and Management
Issues 57 (Quorum Books, 1995) (reviewing Corporate Sentencing Guidelines).
Furthermore, a growing number of state regulations entice companies to create compliance
programs by reducing fines or penalties for violations discovered through an effective program.
See, for example, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 415, § 5/52.2 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1996); Kan. Stat. Ann. §
60-3338(a) (Supp. 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.963 (Supp. 1996).
3. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, ch. 8 (Nov. 1994)
C'USSG"). See generally Winthrop M. Swenson and Nolan E. Clark, The New Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Three Keys to Understanding the Credit for Compliance Programs, 1
Corp. Conduct Q. 1 (1991) (discussing the purpose of the organizational sentencing guidelines);
Richard S. Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing §§ 8.3-8.3.3 (Michie, 1994) (discussing the
underlying principles, scope, and procedures of the organizational sentencing guidelines);
Richard S. Gruner, Towards an Organizational Jurisprudence: Transforming Corporate
Criminal Law Through Federal Sentencing Reform, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 407 (1994) (describing the
background and policy prompting the organizational sentencing guidelines); Ronald J. Maurer,
Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. How Do They Work and What
Are They Supposed to Do?, 18 U. Dayton L. Rev. 799 (1993) (tracing the history of the organiza-
tional sentencing guidelines).
For example, under the Sentencing Guidelines a court may impose significant financial
penalties upon a corporation whose employees act unlawfully for the benefit of the corporation.
USSG § 8C2.4. The guidelines, however, allow a corporation to mitigate its penalty by
conducting an "effective program to prevent and detect violations of law." Id. § 8C2.5(f).
In United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1958), the Supreme Court
made it clear that business entities can be found criminally liable when it ruled that partner-
ships and other business associations may be prosecuted for violating federal laws. See United
States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241 (1st Cir. 1982) ("A corporation may be convicted for the
criminal acts of its agents ... "). See also Ronald L. Dixon, Corporate Criminal Liability, in
Margaret P. Spencer and Ronald R. Sims, eds., Corporate Misconduct. The Legal, Societal, and
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tionwide have sought to establish compliance programs that qualify
for preferred treatment under federal law.4 Such programs, however,
have produced an unanticipated dilemma for many businesses: when
a company responds to regulatory incentives by starting a compre-
hensive compliance program that promotes lawful conduct, it risks
generating incriminating information that may produce criminal or
civil liability.5
For example, to qualify for mitigation under the Sentencing
Guidelines, responsible corporations must institute programs to
assess their compliance with applicable laws and to prevent illegal
conduct within the workplace.6 As part of such ongoing compliance
Management Issues 41, 48-49 (Quorum Books, 1991) (discussing the development of corporate
criminal liability).
4. Andrew R. Apel, Remarks at United States Sentencing Commission Symposium,
Corporate Crime in America: Strengthening the "Good Citizen" Corporation, Washington, D.C.,
Sept. 7-8, 1995 (transcript on file with the Authors). According to Apel's survey data, nearly
40% of all organizations reported that the Sentencing Guidelines "'influenced' them to either
bolster existing efforts or commence new compliance efforts." Id.
Comparable results have occurred in response to some state legislation. See, for example, 4
Prevention Corp. Liability 1 (May 20, 1996) (reporting that 165 firms have notified the Texas
Natural Resource Conservation Commission that they intend to conduct environmental audits
in response to a new state privilege and immunity statute and stating that "[t]he first
audits... have turned up violations that likely would have gone undetected by regulators or not
have been discovered by the companies [absent an audit]").
5. See Ronald J. Allen and Cynthia M. Hazelwood, Preserving the Confidentiality of
Internal Corporate Investigations, 12 J. Corp. L. 355, 357 (1987) (stating that due to the "lack of
a generalized corporate right to privacy" a corporation never knows if the results of an internal
investigation will be used against it by adverse parties); Nancy C. Crisman and Arthur F.
Mathews, Limited Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine in Internal
Corporate Investigations: An Emerging Corporate "Self-Evaluative" Privilege, 21 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 123, 125 (1983) ("One of the principal risks for management has been the difficulty of
clothing such internal corporate investigations with sufficient confidentiality to guarantee that
the investigation, on balance, does more good than harm."); Joseph E. Murphy, Compliance on
Ice: How Litigation Chills Compliance Programs, 2 Corp. Conduct Q. 36, 36-41 (1992)
(juxtaposing chilled and interactive compliance program results); Robert J. Bush, Comment,
Stimulating Corporate Self-Regulation-The Corporate Self-Evaluative Privilege: Paradigmatic
Preferentialism or Pragmatic Panacea, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 597, 599 (1993) (recognizing the
dilemma posed by corporate compliance programs).
In a 1995 survey of 369 United States corporations, 12% of corporations conducting audits
stated that audit results they had voluntarily provided to state or federal regulators were
subsequently used against them for enforcement purposes. Companies Would Perform More
Audits if Penalties Were Eliminated, Survey Says, 25 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 2447 (April 14, 1995)
('Survey).
6. See USSG §§ 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)), 8C2.5(f); Winthrop M. Swenson, An Effective
Program to Prevent and Detect Violations of Law, in Jeffrey M. Kaplan, Joseph E. Murphy, and
Winthrop M. Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs and the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines:
Preventing Criminal and Civil Liability § 4:01 at 1-3 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1993-95)
(arguing that the credit awarded to companies for effective compliance programs is the philo-
sophical centerpiece of the guidelines).
It should be noted that "[c]ommentary in the [Sentencing] Guidelines Manual that inter-
prets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal
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programs, many companies periodically conduct comprehensive
audits.7 These compliance programs and audits inevitably generate a
variety of information and materials ranging from objective facts and
photographs to subjective evaluations, reports, and opinions.8
Businesses use these materials to evaluate their compliance efforts9
and to construct new programs to help prevent future violations. 0
Under present law, however, compliance program and audit
materials are rarely confidential., Consequently, they may be sub-
ject to discovery in criminal investigations and civil actions against
statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline." Stinson v.
United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
7. See Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing § 14.1.2 at 818-20 (cited in note 3)
(discussing the various forms and uses of compliance programs); Swenson and Clark, 1 Corp.
Conduct Q. at 1 (cited in note 3).
8. See Anton R. Valukas, Robert R. Stauffer, and Joseph E. Murphy, Threshold
Considerations, in Jeffrey M. Kaplan, Joseph E. Murphy, and Winthrop M. Swenson, eds.,
Compliance Programs and the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines: Preventing Criminal and Civil
Liability § 5:03 at 2-4 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1993-95) (analyzing the scope of many
compliance programs); John Calvin Conway, Note, Self-Evaluative Privilege and Corporate
Compliance Audits, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 621, 627-30 (1995) (discussing the role of legal compliance
audits).
9. See Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing § 14.1.1 at 817 (cited in note 3)
(recognizing the various ways corporations can use compliance programs); Bush, 87 Nw. U. L.
Rev. at 598 (cited in note 5) (stating that logical corporate managers would conduct internal
investigations in order to assess their legal compliance); Conway, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 627-28
(cited in note 8) ("A legal compliance audit is aimed at assuring or achieving compliance with
the law."). See generally Louis A. Braiotta, Jr., Preventing Fraudulent Reporting: Auditing for
Honesty, 78 A.B.A. J. 76, 79 (May 1992) (noting that corporate counsel and audit committees
often play a central role in compliance efforts).
10. See Louis M. Brown, Legal Audit, 38 S. Cal. L. Rev. 431, 432 (1965) ("[I]f legal
problems can be discovered early, then solution is more available and often less expensive than
it would be after the problem has matured."); Crisman and Mathews, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at
124-25 (cited in note 5) (stating that internal investigations not only protect against penalties
and liability, but also further corporate stewardship); Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing
§ 14.1.2. at 818 (cited in note 3) (stating that compliance efforts can curb illegal conduct in both
the present and future). See generally Michael R. Bromwich and Dorann E. Banks, Today is the
Day to Implement Compliance Programs, N.Y. L. J. at S1 (July 26, 1993) (discussing the
importance of a well-designed compliance program).
11. "[T]he corporation must approach compliance matters with the expectation that
significant disclosures may result, either because a court finds that the materials are not privi-
leged, because the corporation agrees as part of a settlement or plea agreement to disclose the
materials, or because an employee voluntarily discloses them." Valukas, Stauffer, and Murphy,
Threshold Considerations, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 5:10
at 17 (cited in note 8). See James Scott Fargason, Legal Compliance Auditing and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines 36 (1993) ("In general, both on the federal and state levels, internal audit
documentation is discoverable and is not privileged information."); Karla R. Spaulding, "An
Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure" Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations, Fed. Law., 35, 39 (Sept. 1995) ("Although the organizational sentencing
guidelines encourage voluntary reporting ofcrimes, they do not ensure that a company will not
be prosecuted after it turns itself in.").
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the company. 12  Regulatory agencies, 13 corporate shareholders,14 dis-
gruntled employees, 15 and third parties 16 have all successfully ac-
cessed compliance materials in litigation against companies. Unless
protected, these materials threaten to become a litigation road map
for prosecutors and private plaintiffs. 17 Ultimately, if such disclosures
12. Louis M. Brown and Anne 0. Kandel, The Legal Audit, 2-19 to 2-35 (Clark Boardman
Callaghan, 1990); Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing § 14.5.1 at 883 (cited in note 3). See
Queen, Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, in Spencer and Sims, eds., Corporate Misconduct at 63
(cited in note 2) (observing that corporate counsel will often face difficult decisions of whether to
volunteer "ambiguous but arguably criminal activities"); Allen and Hazelwood, 12 J. Corp. L. at
357 (cited in note 5) (stating that some corporate officers do not take aggressive action because
the results of internal investigations may be used against the corporation).
Several legal scholars argue that discovery of audit materials adversely impacts corporate
behavior. See, for example, Jay A. Sigler and Joseph E. Murphy, Interactive Corporate
Compliance" An Alternative to Regulatory Compulsion 125 (Quorum Books, 1988) (stating that
discovery of internal reviews sends the wrong "message" to companies considering issuing
guidelines); James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges: The Need for Legislative
Recognition, 19 Seton Hall Legis. J. 119, 126 (1994) (describing the adverse impact of disclosure
on various aspects of corporate behavior); Jay A. Sigler and Joseph E. Murphy, Corporate
Conduct in the 1990s, in Jay A. Sigler and Joseph E. Murphy, eds., Corporate Lawbreaking and
Interactive Compliance 153, 183 (Quorum Books, 1991) (arguing that immunity for good faith
audits will promote corporate compliance). For example, when corporations fear that audit
materials will be used against them, they examine fewer internal activities, undertake fewer
types of investigations, translate fewer findings into corrective plans, distribute criticism less
widely and retain analysis for shorter periods. O'Reilly, 19 Seton Hall Legis. J. at 126 (cited in
this note).
13. See, for example, University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 188-202 (1990)
(ruling that academic peer review materials are not protected by "self-evaluative privilege");
State ex rel. Celebrezze v. CECOS Int'l., Inc., 583 N.E.2d 1118, 1121 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that a state agency may discover environmental audit materials); $1.05 Million Fine
Against Coors May Deter Corporate Environmental Audits, Firm Says, 24 Envir. Rptr. (BNA)
570, 570-71 (July 30, 1993) (finding that a government agency used a brewery's voluntary audit
materials to impose fine on the brewery). See also Arthur F. Mathews, Symposium, Current
Issues in Corporate Governance: Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 Ohio St. L. J. 655 (1984)
(describing the SEC's use of corporate audit materials in enforcement proceedings).
14. See, for example, In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, 792 F. Supp. 197, 205
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that the "self-evaluative privilege" held by corporations must be bal-
anced against a plaintiffs need for discovery); In re Sahlen & Associates, Inc., Fed. Secur. L.
Rptr. (CCH) 95,822 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that securities audit materials are discoverable).
15. See, for example, Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 330-31 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (holding that audit materials prepared by company during review of employment prac-
tices are discoverable in a subsequent suit for sexual discrimination); Hardy v. New York News,
Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that employment-related audit materials are
not privileged); Robinson v. Magovern, 83 F.R.D. 79, 82-88 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that mate-
rials evaluating a university's tenure process are discoverable).
16. Bush, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 603 (cited in note 5). See, for example, Adams v. Wecker,
CA No. L-09761-85, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987).
17. See Allen and Hazelwood, 12 J. Corp. L. at 357 (cited in note 5) (discussing problems
created by the lack of a generalized right of corporate privacy); Lawrence B. Pedowitz and Carol
Miller, Confronting the Criminal Investigation, in Stephen M. Axinn and Jed S. Rakoff, eds.,
Corporate Criminal Liability: Representing Corporations, CEOs, Corporate Officers, and the
Impact of the Sentencing Guidelines 1991 at 133, 136-37 (Practising Law Institute, 1991)
(advising corporations on the proper course of conduct when the government seizes documents
generated by an internal investigation); Valukas, Stauffer, and Murphy, Threshold
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are routinely allowed, they will undermine the law enforcement poli-
cies upon which the Sentencing Guidelines and comparable measures
are premised: that corporate good citizenship can be induced through
incentives that promote self-policing.' 8 Notwithstanding this impor-
tant social policy, the disclosure risks posed by audit materials in
litigation have generated only sporadic judicial or legislative attempts
to confer protections.
Only a few courts have responded to this dilemma by protect-
ing potentially adverse compliance materials from disclosure. 19 In
such instances, compliance materials have been shielded through a
variety of methods, including the attorney-client privilege,20 the work
product doctrine, 21 and a self-evaluative privilege. 22  Most courts,
Considerations, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 5:07 at 9 (cited
in note 8) (advising corporations to be selective in their use of internal investigations); Bush, 87
Nw. U. L. Rev. at 599 (cited in note 5) (describing internal investigation results as "smoking
gun[sl" to be used against a corporation). See also Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing §
14.5.1 at 884 (cited in note 3) ("In addition to highlighting past misconduct, compliance program
reports may give plaintiffs a list of disgruntled employees who will be useful deposition
targets.").
18. See Winthrop M. Swenson, Remarks at United States Sentencing Commission
Symposium, Corporate Crime in Anerica: Strengthening the "Good Citizen" Corporation,
Washington, D.C., Sept. 7-8, 1995 (Sentencing Guidelines create incentives for companies to
take crime-controlling actions) (transcript on file with the authors); William W. Wilkins, Jr.,
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants, 3 Fed. Sent. Rptr. (Vera) 118, 119 (1990)
(stating that a draft of the Sentencing Guidelines would reduce fines in certain instances to
encourage desirable corporate behavior).
19. See, for example, Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970)
(recognizing an "overwhelming public interest" in keeping hospital staff meetings confidential).
See also 1995 Ark. Acts 350 § 8-1-301; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126.5(1) (Supp. 1996); 1995 Idaho
Sess. Laws 359 § 9-802(a); Va. Code § 10.1-1198(B) (Supp. 1996). But see James F. Flanagan,
Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-Critical Analyses, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 551, 574-76 (1983)
(arguing that privileges do not promote corporate compliance).
20. See Part III.A.1.
21. See Part III.A.2.
22. See Part III.A.3.
A few commentators would add the ombudsman privilege to this list. See Thomas Furtado,
Remarks at United States Sentencing Commission Symposium, Corporate Crime in America:
Strengthening the "Good Citizen" Corporation, Washington, D.C., Sept. 7-8, 1995 (transcript on
file with the authors). No court has yet determined, however, whether this privilege protects
compliance materials beyond those directly related to the ombudsman function. Presently, only
a few courts protect communications between the ombudsman and the employee, and many of
these courts limit their holdings to the specific facts of the case. See Kientzy v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570, 571 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (outlining factors considered before granting
privileged status to statements made before an ombudsman); Monoranjan Roy v. United
Technologies Corp., Civil Case No. H89-680, slip op. (D. Conn.1990); Garstang v. Superior Court,
46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) ("In our opinion, private institutions have a qualified
privilege not to disclose communications made before an ombudsman in an attempt to mediate
an employee dispute. That qualified privilege is based on California's constitutional right of
privacy."). See generally Brenda V. Thompson, Comment, Corporate Ombudsmen and
Privileged Communications: Should Employee Communications to Corporate Ombudsmen Be
Entitled to Privilege?, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 653 (1992) (analyzing the emerging trend of treating
discussions with ombudsmen as traditionally privileged communications).
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however, have either rejected a privilege for compliance materials23 or
limited the protections to an extent that renders them useless. 24
Given the judiciary's reluctance to protect compliance materi-
als, several state legislatures have considered proposals that would
shield compliance materials generated in the public interest.25 For
example, most state legislatures have enacted statutes designed to
limit access.to materials derived from medical audits, 6 and several
states protect materials generated during environmental audits.27
Though helpful, these provisions do not provide the comprehensive
protection that is required for the potential benefits of incentive-based
compliance programs to be achieved.
This Article argues that, in order to eliminate the dilemma
posed by the potential disclosure of adverse compliance materials, a
limited evidentiary privilege must be established to protect certain
compliance materials from disclosure. With this in mind, Part II
describes corporate compliance programs in further detail, traces
their theoretical underpinnings, and explains the effect of the
Sentencing Guidelines. Part III surveys the ad hoc common-law and
statutory solutions to the dilemma faced by businesses considering
internal compliance programs. Finally, Part IV concludes that
statutory protection of compliance materials is vital to promoting
compliance programs and proposes legislation shielding certain mate-
rials generated under programs that meet Sentencing Guidelines
requirements.
23. Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
a self-evaluative privilege for routine safety inspections); FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (rejecting a self-evaluative privilege); United States v. Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D.
8 (D. Conn. 1990) (rejecting a self-evaluative privilege for environmental compliance materials).
24. See, for example, Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 433-34 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (limiting application of the self-evaluative privilege). See also Bush, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. at
609-12 (cited in note 5) (stating that the lack of a privilege for objective facts threatens the
viability of the corporate self-evaluative privilege).
25. The Arkansas legislature recently adopted an environmental bill declaring that "the
public will benefit from incentives to identify and remedy environmental compliance issues."
1995 Ark. Acts 350 § 8-1-301. See also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126.5(1) (pointing out that
environmental compliance is in the public interest).
26. See David W. Jorstad, Note, The Legal Liability of Medical Peer Review Participants
for Revocation of Hospital Staff Privileges, 28 Drake L. Rev. 692, 694 n.11 (1979) (listing thirty-
four states that have some type of statutory immunity for medical peer review).
27. These states are Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. See, for example, 1995
Ark. Acts 350 § 8-1-301; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126.5; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 415, § 5/52.2; Ind. Code
Ann. § 13-28-4-1 (Burns, 1996); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 224.01-040 (Michie, 1995); Or. Rev. Stat. §
468.963; Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-1105 (Supp. 1996).
See also Thomas E. Lindley and Jerry B. Hodson, Environmental Audit Privilege Oregon's
Experiment, 24 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1221 (Oct. 29, 1993) (describing Oregon's legislative attempt
to protect environmental audit materials).
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II. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND COMPLIANCE AuDITS
Compliance programs are organizational systems aimed at
comprehensively detecting and preventing corporate criminality.
28
Such programs perform two essential objectives: First, they deter
misconduct within a corporation. 29 Second, they provide an internal
method of policing and reporting misconduct.30 To accomplish these
goals, businesses employ a variety of methods, 31 including compliance
28. See USSG § 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)); Gruner, Corporate Crine and Sentencing § 14.1.1
at 817 (cited in note 3) (defining an effective compliance program as "systematic measures taken
by firms to detect and prevent corporate offenses"); Swenson, Effective Program, in Kaplan,
Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs §§ 4:06-4:07 (cited in note 6) (discussing the
general criteria underlying, and precise actions necessary for, an effective compliance program).
Even the Supreme Court concedes that "[i]n light of the vast and complicated array of
regulatory legislation confronting the modern corporation, corporations, unlike most individu-
als, 'constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law,' particularly since compliance with
the law in this area is hardly an instinctive matter." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
392 (1981) (citation omitted). As one commentator notes:
[lit is virtually impossible for even a well-intentioned company to be in full compliance,
at all times, with all of our complex federal, state and local ... regulations.
.... [The law is so complex that no sizable company can comply with it at all
times in all respects....
The problem is that even responsible companies do not feel free to audit .... They
are concerned about the risks that arise from [the fact that] ... [a] thorough audit will
probably turn up some instance(s) of non-compliance with some law or regulation.
Barry Goode, Patrick 0. Cavanaugh, and Trent Norris, The Environmental Self-Audit Privilege:
A Selected Bibliography, 14 Preventive L. Rptr. 36, 36 (Summer 1995).
29. Charles J. Walsh and Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to
Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 605, 645 (1995). See
Kenneth K. Marshall, R. Malcolm Schwartz, and Brian J. Kinman, Auditing and Monitoring
Systems, in Jeffirey M. Kaplan, Joseph E. Murphy, and Winthrop M. Swenson, eds., Compliance
Programs and the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines: Preventing Criminal and Civil Liability §
11:45 at 47 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1993-95) ("[Ihe mere existence of an effective auditing
and monitoring system may serve as a deterrent to any would-be violators."). This objective is
clearly implied in the Guideline requiring that a program "prevent... violations of law." USSG
§§ 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)), 8C2.5(o.
30. Walsh and Pyrich, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. at 645 (cited in note 29). This objective is also
evident in the Guideline requiring that a program "detect violations of law." USSG §§ 8A1.2
comment. (3(k)), 8C2.5(f).
31. Frequently statutes or agency rulings or announcements will outline proper compli-
ance methods for corporations. For example, the Sentencing Guidelines describe factors
considered by a court to determine whether a corporation meets the due diligence requirements
of an effective compliance program. See note 87 and accompanying text. The Department of
Justice has also set forth a list of standards that influence its decision whether to prosecute
environmental wrongdoing:
[]n 1991 the Department of Justice announced its intention not to prosecute corpora-
tions having substantial programs to ensure environmental law compliance if such firms
disclose employee offenses and cooperate with subsequent government investigations of
the reported offenses. To qualify for this favorable prosecutorial treatment, a firm
should have a "regularized, intensive, and comprehensive environmental compliance
program" adopted in good faith and in a timely manner. The Department's standards
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audits, 2 employee training,33 reporting mechanisms, 34 and sanctions
for illegal actions. 5 When they are properly conducted, compliance
programs often provide a good measure of a firm's legal status.36
Accordingly, because of the benefits associated with compliance
investigations,3 7 most publicly held corporations now maintain such
programs in at least some capacity.38
include a detailed list of criteria that prosecutors are instructed to use in evaluating the
substantiality of compliance programs. Prosecutors are to look for the following pro-
gram features:
(1) A strong institutional policy to comply with all environmental requirements;
(2) Safeguards beyond those required by existing law to prevent noncompliance from
occurring;
(3) Regular procedures, including internal or external compliance and management
audits, to evaluate, detect, prevent and remedy circumstances like those that led to non-
compliance;
(4) Procedures and safeguards to ensure the integrity of any audit conducted;
(5) Evaluations of all sources of pollution (i.e., all media), including the possibility of
cross-media transfers of pollutants;
(6) Timely implementation of recommendations for improvement by auditors or
evaluators;
(7) Adequate resources committed to audit or evaluation programs and to implement-
ing their recommendations; and
(8) Evaluations of employee and corporate departmental performance regarding envi-
ronmental compliance.
Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing § 14.1.5 at 823-24 (cited in note 3) (citing Justice
Department Factors (cited in note 2)).
32. See id. § 14.3.5(f) at 861-65 (recommending compliance audits for large corporations);
Marshall, Schwartz, and Kinman, Auditing and Monitoring Systems, in Kaplan, Murphy, and
Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs §§ 11:07, 11:16 (cited in note 29) (discussing compliance
and audit programs).
33. See Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing § 14.2.2(f) at 848 (cited in note 3)
(recommending employee selection, training, and reward systems); Timothy C. Mazur, Training,
in Jeffrey M. Kaplan, Joseph E. Murphy, and Winthrop M. Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs
and the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines: Preventing Criminal and Civil Liability § 10:02 at 2-7
(Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1993-95) (discussing the role of training in an effective compliance
program). See also USSG § 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)(4)) (stating that due diligence requires that
the company communicate compliance standards and procedures to all employees through, for
example, training programs).
34. See USSG § 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)(5)) (stating that due diligence requires, for example,
that the company utilize a reporting system through which employees can report criminal
conduct within the organization without fear of retribution). See note 85 and accompanying
text.
35. See Ilene H. Nagel and Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their
Future, 71 Wash. U. L. Q. 205, 244 (1993) (stating that corporations must take steps to "increase
the likelihood that the individuals responsible for the offense [will] be held accountable for their
illegal conduct!'). See also USSG § 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)(6)) (finding that due diligence requires
that the company consistently enforce compliance standards and procedures through
disciplinary measures).
36. Brown and Kandel, Legal Audit at 1-9 to 1-11 (cited in note 12); Gruner, Corporate
Crime and Sentencing § 14.3.5 at 855-56 (cited in note 3).
37. See notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
38. Apel, Remarks at United States Sentencing Commission Symposium (cited in note 4).
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Rather than maintain an institutionalized compliance pro-
gram, however, some businesses merely conduct periodic compliance
audits. Like the broader compliance program concept, compliance
audits39 are investigations aimed at discovering existing or potential
legal problems in a company.40  Unlike compliance programs, which
are usually integrated as part of a business's organizational structure,
compliance audits are not institutionalized within the operational
structure, and they usually do not provide a long-term assessment of
compliance status. Instead, such audits focus on a firm's compliance
condition at a specific time. Compliance audits tend to function as
subsets of larger compliance programs. 41
Although audits merely reveal a company's compliance status
for a particular period of time,4 2 they are key to a company's ability to
39. Authors often refer to these audits as "compliance audits" or "legal audits." See, for
example, Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing § 14.3.5 at 861-64 (cited in note 3); Marshall,
Schwartz, and Kinman, Auditing and Monitoring Systems, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson,
eds., Compliance Programs § 11:07 at 6 (cited in note 29). In addition to "compliance audits,"
the EPA also encourages the use of "management audits." Hunt and Wilkins define the differ-
ence between the two audits as follows:
Compliance audits focus on existing and potential environmental hazards, releases, and
discharges for the purposes of (1) complying with environmental laws and regulations,
(2) identifying nonregulatory risks, including potential liability associated with toxic tort
actions, off-site disposal, or citizen suits, (3) evaluating the need to remediate existing
environmental conditions and the methods used to do so, and (4) assessing the corpora-
tion's or facility's vulnerability to environmental enforcement proceedings.
Management audits evaluate a corporation's or facility's management systems or
procedures for (1) identifying environmental noncompliance, (2) assessing environ-
mental risks, (3) informing the corporation's decisionmakers of such risks, (4) designing
and implementing measures to prevent environmental violations and mitigate nonregu-
latory environmental risk, and (5) remediating or otherwise responding to potential or
actual environmental hazards. A comprehensive management audit will review the or-
ganization, structure, and placement of the environmental oversight functions; will
evaluate the adequacy of existing statements of the company's environmental mission,
goals, and objectives; and will consider the adequacy of current planning and control
mechanisms to ensure that environmental criteria are adequately considered in evaluat-
ing both individual and organizational performance. It also entails developing operating
procedures, training manuals, preventive maintenance programs, proactive planning,
and total quality management enhancements to convert high-minded policy statements
into a pervasive corporate culture of environmental stewardship.
Terrell E. Hunt and Timothy A. Wilkins, Environmental Audits and Enforcement Policy, 16
Harv. Envir. L. Rev. 365, 366 nn. 7-8 (1992).
40. See Marshall, Schwartz, and Kinman, Auditing and Monitoring Systems, in Kaplan,
Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 11:02 at 2 (cited in note 29) (" 'Auditing' is
an independent investigation of a particular activity. It is a systematic process by which some-
one objectively obtains and evaluates evidence to corroborate a particular assertion.").
41. See Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing § 14.3.5(f at 862 (cited in note 3) ("Legal
audits tend to provide a 'snap shot' of the legal status of a firm at a particular time .... "). See
also note 40 and accompanying text.
42. Compliance audits have also been compared to a "snapshot." Gruner, Corporate Crime
and Sentencing § 14.3.5(f) at 862 (cited in note 3). Compliance programs, in contrast, are best
viewed as an ongoing "movie." Swenson, Effective Program, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson,
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assess its overall compliance effectiveness. 43  For this reason,
companies that follow the Sentencing Guidelines standards conduct
periodic compliance audits as part of their ongoing compliance
programs. 44  Such audits occur in a wide range of areas, including
securities,45  employment practices, 46  product safety,47  and
environmental regulation.48
A. The Benefits of Internal Compliance Programs and Audits
Ultimately, both compliance programs and audits provide
several potential benefits for corporations.49 First, if properly imple-
mented, they allow a business to evaluate its potential criminal or
civil liability,50 assess legal defenses,5' and make appropriate economic
decisions. 52 As such, regardless of whether a program uncovers mis-
eds., Compliance Programs § 4:11 at 26 (cited in note 6). See also Gruner, Corporate Crime and
Sentencing § 14.3.5(f) at 862 (cited in note 3) (comparing ongoing compliance programs to a
"'flow' analysis").
43. See Brown and Kandel, Legal Audit at 1-8 to 1-11 (cited in note 12); Marshall,
Schwartz, and Kinman, Auditing and Monitoring Systems, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson,
eds., Compliance Programs § 11.19 at 21 (cited in note 29) (stating that audits are "generally
needed to assess whether monitoring controls are functioning as prescribed").
44. See Marshall, Schwartz, and Kinman, Auditing and Monitoring Systems, in Kaplan,
Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 11:07 at 5-7 (cited in note 29) (discussing
the necessity of periodic compliance audits in the modern business world).
45. See, for example, Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, 792 F. Supp. at 205-06; In re
Salomon Brothers Security Litigation, Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 1 97,254 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
46. See, for example, EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 333-34 (7th
Cir. 1983); Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Division), 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(stating that the defendant corporation "has been subject to annual audits of its employment
practices and employment statistics").
47. See, for example, Adams, CA No. L-09761-85, slip op.; Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107
F.R.D. 678, 684-85 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
48. See, for example, Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 527 (N.D.
Fla. 1994); Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. at 8-10; CECOS Int'l., Inc., 583 N.E.2d at 1119.
49. Brown and Kandel, Legal Audit at 1-9 to 1-11 (cited in note 12); Gruner, Corporate
Crime and Sentencing §§ 14.1.1-14.1.8, 14.3.5(f) (cited in note 3); Sigler and Murphy, Interactive
Corporate Compliance at 79-89 (cited in note 12).
50. Brown and Kandel, Legal Audit at 1-10 (cited in note 12). See generally Thomas B.
Heffelfinger, Compliance Program Checklist, 13 Preventive L. Rptr. 33 (Spring 1994) (providing
a list of issues that may arise through a compliance program).
51. Anton R. Valukas and Robert R. Stauffer, Investigation and Disclosure of Violations,
in Jeffrey M. Kaplan, Joseph E. Murphy, and Winthrop M. Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs
and the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines: Preventing Criminal and Civil Liability § 13:04
(Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1993-95).
52. Id. § 13:04 at 5. See Flanagan, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 562-72 (cited in note 19)
(describing commercial motivations for internal investigations); Mathews, 45 Ohio St. L. J. at
670-71 (cited in note 13) (stating that internal investigations help management decide "whom to
hire or fire, whom to promote or demote, what activities to divest or terminate and what modifi-
cations in business practice or activity to adopt or promote"); Janet Purdy Levaux, How to
Foster Honesty in Your Company, Investor's Business Daily A4 (Dec. 5, 1994) (discussing the
potential for a quality ethics program to result in reduced penalties for misconduct).
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conduct, compliance reviews frequently assist the company economi-
cally by exposing inefficient employees or unprofitable departments. 53
Second, an effective compliance program can help a company
avoid indictment.54 For example, a credible and comprehensive pro-
gram may demonstrate to prosecutors that the company and its em-
ployees lacked the mens rea required for criminal liability. The exis-
tence of an objectively reasonable program arguably establishes
corporate good faith and is thereby inconsistent with criminal intent.
Alternatively, a good compliance program may allow a company to
discover and address misconduct, thus avoiding an intrusive
government investigation.55  If an investigation does occur, the
information gained through the program can also give a firm more
control over the direction and scope of the investigation. 56
Furthermore, when the government investigation finds evidence of
criminality, an effective compliance program may help the business
identify an appropriate defense. 57
53. See Kirk S. Jordan, Designing and Implementing a Corporate Code of Conduct in the
Context of an "Effective" Compliance Program, 12 Preventive L. Rptr. 3, 6 (Winter 1993);
Levaux, Investor's Business Daily at A4 (cited in note 52); Marshall, Schwartz, and Kinman,
Auditing and Monitoring Systems, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance
Programs § 11:03 at 3 (cited in note 29) (stating that "internal audit departments often perform
operational and efficiency reviews").
54. See Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing § 14.1.5 at 823 (cited in note 3)
(discussing the fact that "prosecutors will often refrain from charging firms that have effective
compliance programs").
55. Id. § 14.1.7 at 828-29. See also Mathews, 45 Ohio St. L. J. at 671 (cited in note 13)
(discussing how compliance programs influence charging decisions); Valukas and Stauffer,
Investigation and Disclosure of Violations, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance
Programs § 13:04 at 5 (cited in note 51) ("[A] credible internal investigation can help the
corporation avoid being subjected to a wide-ranging, intrusive government investigation into the
corporation's affairs and give the corporation more control over the nature and focus of the
investigation.").
56. See Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing § 14.1.5 at 825 (cited in note 3) (stating
that compliance programs may "influence the scope and severity of enforcement responses");
Valukas and Stauffer, Investigation and Disclosure of Violations, in Kaplan, Murphy, and
Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 13:04 at 5 (cited in note 51) (stating that an effective
program "may assist in persuading the government.., to reduce the scope of its investigation").
57. Valukas and Stauffer, Investigation and Disclosure of Violations, in Kaplan, Murphy,
and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 13:04 at 5 (cited in note 51). For example, a compli-
ance program may be used by a business to show that illegal conduct occurred outside the scope
of employment or that the culpable employee did not intend to benefit the company. See United
States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that the existence of a compliance
program discouraging illegal activity may suggest that employee misconduct was outside scope
of employment); United States v. Basic Const. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding
compliance efforts relevant to deciding whether an employee committed crime to benefit the
company). Under traditional principles of vicarious liability in criminal cases, a principal may
not be held liable for actions outside the scope of employment or not intended to benefit the
company. See Kathleen F. Brickey, 1 Corporate Criminal Liability: A Treatise on the'Criminal
Liability of Corporations, Their Officers and Agents § 5:01 at 148-49 (Clark Boardman
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Third, compliance programs can provide a defense in civil
litigation or help persuade potential plaintiffs that their claims are
weak.58 Moreover, even against strong claims, the information gener-
ated by compliance programs can help the company to negotiate a
settlement based on all the facts, not just those alleged by the plain-
tiff.5
Finally, comprehensive compliance materials may enable the
business to respond in a variety of contexts to allegations of wrongdo-
ing.60 For example, information gained from the compliance program
may assist the business in its public relations campaign6' and in deal-
ing with shareholders.62
Callaghan, 2d ed. 1991). Brickey describes circumstances leading to principal liability as
follows:
The principal theories under which courts have held corporate officers liable for criminal
violations occurring within the corporation are three in number. First, one who
performs an act constituting a criminal offense is personally accountable for the crime,
notwithstanding that the agent was acting for the corporation in an official or
representative capacity. Corporate agents may not use the corporate entity as a shield
against personal liablity for their misdeeds.
Second, corporate employees may be accountable, under principles of accomplice
liability, for crimes committed by their cohorts and subordinates. Anyone who aids,
counsels, commands, encourages, or otherwise assists another to engage in conduct
constituting an offense is liable for the crime in the same manner as the actual
perpetrator.
And third, criminal responsibility may derive from failure to control corporate
misconduct. One who has control over activities that lead to a subordinate's violation
may incur liability for failure to fulfill corporate heirarchy, to prevent or correct such
violations.
Id.
58. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 968 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding a company
not liable for a sexually hostile work environment because the company had reporting and
disciplinary measures in place); Valukas and Stauffer, Investigation and Disclosure of
Violations, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 13:04 at 7 (cited in
note 51). See also Mathews, 45 Ohio St. L. J. at 672 (cited in note 13) ("[A]n internal self-
investigation, if careful, thorough, and independent, may provide the board of directors with a
solid basis for terminating or settling favorably derivative suits or class actions respecting the
corporate problems investigated.").
59. Valukas and Stauffer, Investigation and Disclosure of Violations, in Kaplan, Murphy,
and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 13:04 at 6-7 (cited in note 51).
60. For example, Valukas and Stauffer state that:
In instances where a large number of potential plaintiffs exist, the investigation may
enable the corporation to identify and settle with principal potential plaintiffs before
formal litigation arises. Such a settlement will place the corporation in a much better
position to deal with other potential plaintiffs, and the possibility of a class-action law-
suit becomes less significant.
Id. § 13:04 at 7.
61. See Gruner, Corporate Crimne and Sentencing § 13.5 at 791-94 (cited in note 3)
(discussing the impact of corporate misconduct on institutional reputation); Jonathan M.
Karpoff and John R. Lott, Jr., Why the Commission's Corporate Guidelines May Create
Disparity, 3 Fed. Sent. Rptr. (Vera) 140, 140 (1990) (discussing the role that market forces play
in policing fraud). See also Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing § 14.1.8 at 829 (cited in
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Despite these benefits, however, several risks are attendant to
comprehensive programs and audits. First, such programs often
generate a record of ongoing illegal activity. 63 These materials, if
discoverable, may expose the company to criminal or civil liability.64
Compliance programs may also uncover evidence of past illegal
conduct that can be difficult or expensive to remedy. Failure to report
and correct such conduct promptly65 can also create liability, as fed-
eral or state requirements often mandate disclosure.66
note 3) (suggesting that a good compliance program may help a company "maintain [its] good
reputation" and "gain a competitive advantage"). For example, information gathered through a
compliance audit may help the company regain investor confidence and may quiet talk of
potential derivative suits. See id. (discussing evidence that shareholders generally react unfa-
vorably when criminal conduct by a corporation is announced); John A. Meyers, Remarks at
United States Sentencing Commission Symposium, Corporate Crime in America- Strengthening
the "Good Citizen" Corporation, Washington, D.C., Sept. 7-8, 1995 (transcript on file with the
Authors) (describing negative shareholder reaction to wrongdoing by National Medical
Enterprises).
62. See Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate
Behavior, 71 B.U. L Rev. 395, 411-13 (1991) (discussing the reputational effects and stigma that
accompany criminal sanctions for a corporation).
63. See Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322, 1325 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982)
(stating that Ward's "own audits indicated violations of its corporate compliance program");
Gruncr, Corporate Crime and Sentencing § 14.5.1 at 883 (cited in note 3) ('Managers of firms
operating law compliance programs often fear that corporate personnel carrying out the
programs will gather information and create records that will be used against the firms in later
litigation or other contexts."). See also Valukas, Stauffer, and Murphy, Threshold
Considerations, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs §§ 5:03-5:07
(cited in note 8) (discussing corporate document retention). See also notes 11-18 and
accompanying text (discussing the problems companies face when illegal conduct is recorded).
64. See Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing § 14.5.1 at 883 (cited in note 3) C'Law
compliance programs may increase ... liability through the revelation of offenses that would
have otherwise gone undetected and unpunished."); Mathews, 45 Ohio St. L. J. at 672 (cited in
note 13) (observing that by conducting an internal investigation a company may build a case for
its private or governmental enemies). See also Survey at 2447 (cited in note 5) (finding that
12% of corporations conducting audits stated that audit results they had voluntarily provided to
state or federal regulators had been used against them for enforcement purposes).
65. In the environmental context, the Department of Justice has stated that it "is more
interested in prosecuting the corporate executive who ignores the results of an audit that shows
problems. Intentionally ignoring environmental problems is known as willful blindness, which
[the] DOJ will prosecute in a criminal case ...." DOJ Plans To Issue Policy Statement on Use of
Corporate Environmental Audits, 22 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 484 (June 21, 1991). See also Valukas
ahd Stauffer, hwestigation and Disclosure of Violations, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson, eds.,
Compliance Programs § 13:03 at 3-4 (cited in note 51) ("[D]irectors or officers may face personal
liability for failing to investigate under circumstances which raise a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing."). See generally William E. Knepper and Dan A. Bailey, Liability of Corporate
Officers and Directors (Michie, 4th ed. 1988).
66. A separate problem arises if the corporation is not required to report the results:
When may the company destroy the compliance materials without violating federal criminal
statutes, and which materials may it destroy? Fedders and Guttenplan address these questions,
stating that:
Companies which adopt records management programs... confront difficult legal and
ethical questions regarding, first, continuing ad hoc search and destroy operations, and
second, the timing of suspensions of routine document destruction programs in the face
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Finally, ongoing compliance programs can be expensive. 67 Fees
to outside professionals for compliance services can be costly. Busi-
nesses often hire an internal team of attorneys, auditors, and other
professionals ("ethics officers," for example) whose sole task is to
manage the compliance process. Nor are expenses limited to profes-
sional fees. Internal investigations associated with compliance pro-
grams may increase costs due to lost time, lower productivity, and
decreased morale when employee attention is unduly diverted from
the ordinary course of business.68 Given these trade-offs, the profit
of "reasonably" or "clearly" foreseeable or pending investigations or proceedings. Beyond
doubt, federal criminal statutes and the Code of Professional Responsibility are violated
if management and counsel agree to destroy relevant documents after process requiring
their production has been served. Furthermore, great risk of violation arises if man-
agement and counsel agree to destroy relevant documents in the course of voluntary co-
operation with government authorities, or upon learning indirectly of relevant govern-
ment inquiry. Many other actions by management and counsel, both intentional and in-
advertent, give rise to the possibility of criminal and ethical sanctions.
For these reasons, what once was a simple business decision to destroy obsolete or
seemingly inconsequential documents has become a senior management concern deserv-
ing serious and thoughtful attention. Lawyers must be prepared to assist business cli-
ents in responding to the continually enlarging sphere of difficulties surrounding the de-
struction of documents. The possible legal, practical and ethical consequences of docu-
ment destruction are vast ....
John M. Fedders and Lauryn H. Guttenplan, Document Retention and Destruction: Practical,
Legal and Ethical Considerations, 56 Notre Dame Law. 5, 64 (1980). See also Lawrence Solum
and Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36
Emory L. J. 1085, 1087-1106 (1987) (describing the legal doctrines used to control destruction of
evidence and the possibility of criminal prosecution for the destruction of evidence in civil
litigation).
67. See Valukas and Stauffer, Investigation and Disclosure of Violations, in Kaplan,
Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 13:05 at 8-8.1 (cited in note 51) (describing
the various costs incurred in conducting an internal investigation); Mathews, 45 Ohio St. L. J.
at 672 (cited in note 13) (advising smaller and financially insecure companies to let the SEC
assume the cost of developing the facts instead of conducting their own internal investigations).
68. Valukas and Stauffer, Investigation and Disclosure of Violations, in Kaplan, Murphy,
and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 13:05 at 8-8.1 (cited in note 51). Compliance pro-
grams typically do not impose unreasonable demands upon employees-indeed, often employees
are not even conscious that their reporting requirement and training meetings are part of a
larger compliance program-but a periodic audit of a department may require employees to
spend time assembling files, reviewing old data, and interviewing with auditors. See generally
Marshall, Schwartz, and Kinman, Auditing and Monitoring Systems, in Kaplan, Murphy, and
Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 11:26.5 at 28-29 (cited in note 29) (discussing the use of
surveys and random employee interviews in compliance programs). Although this type of
comprehensive review is generally a good housekeeping measure for departments, it can affect
morale if employees perceive the audit as reflecting lack of confidence or even distrust by
management.
Gruner notes that, in spite of these potential negative effects on employees, compliance
programs can also promote long-term positive effects on personnel as well:
In many companies, law compliance systems are part of broader ethics programs. These
ethics programs encourage employees to observe stated corporate values in dealings
with other employees, customers, suppliers, and members of surrounding communities.
Ethics codes are at the core of most corporate ethics programs. These codes invariably
require law compliance, but typically go further to mandate adherence to other values
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motive alone will not always cause a business to establish a compli-
ance program. Often, therefore, the decision to initiate such a
program is induced by regulatory agencies who consider compliance
programs to be utilitarian.
From the regulatory perspective, compliance programs carry
important benefits for society at large. First, such programs may
serve the public interest by identifying potential problems within a
company before the matter reaches crisis proportions for the business
and its community. For example, a bank might regularly audit its
security traders to determine whether they are properly managing the
bank's assets.69 By promptly discovering financial discrepancies or
unapproved trading practices, the bank can avoid an institutional
financial crisis with broader ramifications 0°  Such compliance pro-
grams protect both the bank executives and shareholders, as well as
anyone who does business with the bank, including depositors, mer-
chants, investors, and deposit insurers.71
Second, effective compliance programs result in lower costs of
goods and services for consumers.7 2 These savings occur because
compliance efforts allow corporations to identify and eliminate ineffi-
cient or unprofitable employees, departments, and procedures.7 3 As
and practices selected by top corporate managers. Such codes can promote ethical val-
ues in addition to ensuring law compliance.
By defining required conduct in terms of ethical concerns beyond mere law compli-
ance, business ethics codes and related ethics programs often clarify and encourage
work behaviors promoting law compliance. Ethical standards and guidance "may serve
to improve compliance by removing ambiguity or vagueness with respect to acceptable
conduct, by clarifying management's expectations and overriding competing perform-
ance incentives, and by encouraging employee 'whistleblowing."
Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing § 14.1.8 at 831-32 (cited in note 3) (citations omitted).
69. For examples of what can happen in the absence of effective compliance programs, see
Marc Levinson and Michael Meyer, Billion-Dollar Bath, Newsweek 54 (Oct. 9, 1995) (pointing
out that an unsupervised trader lost over $1 billion for Daiwa Bank); Bill Powell, Busted!,
Newsweek 37 (March 13, 1995) (pointing out that an unsupervised trader lost over $1 billion for
Barings PLC).
70. See Powell, Newsweek at 37 (cited in note 69) (pointing out that the Barings failure
affected bank customers, investors, employees, and creditors).
71. See generally Roy A. Schotland, Re-examining the Freedom of Information Act's
Exception 8: Does It Give an Unduly "Full Service" Exemption for Bank Examination Reports
and Related Material?, 9 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 43 (1995) (discussing the role of audits,
examinations, and compliance programs in bank operations).
72. This assumes that the market is working efficiently. But see Frances L. Edwards,
Worker Right-to-Know Laws: Ineffectiveness of Current Policy-Making and a Proposed
Legislative Solution, 15 B.C. Envir. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1987) ("[I]ndustries will offset additional
financial burdens of compliance by passing costs on to the consumers."); John J. Voortman,
Curbing Aftermnarket Monopolization, 19 J. Legis. 155, 167 (1993) '[I]t is apparent
that.., policing compliance will involve substantial costs. These costs may well increase the
price of the repairs to the consumers.").
73. See Jordan, 12 Preventive L. Rptr. at 6 (cited in note 53).
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the company becomes more efficient, its operating costs fall, thereby
creating an opportunity to lower prices for its customers.74 Similarly,
because compliance programs can prevent wrongful conduct from
occurring, businesses pay less in attorney's fees, criminal fines, and
civil judgments, thus lowering the overall cost of doing business.
These savings ultimately benefit the consumer in the form of lower
prices. 75
B. Compliance Programs, Audits, and the United States Sentencing
Guidelines
Because effective compliance programs carry significant social
benefits, the United States Sentencing Commission 76 (Commission")
incorporated within its Sentencing Guidelines incentives to induce
corporations to implement such programs. These incentives operate
in two ways: (1) by rewarding the creation of "effective program[s] to
prevent and detect violations of law,"77 and (2) by sanctioning the
underlying illegal conduct.78 In an attempt to induce more companies
to create effective compliance programs, the Commission combined
specific requirements with general ameliorative principles, thus
74. Lower costs to the corporation do not automatically mean lower costs to the consumer.
Even if consumer costs do not fall, however, society still enjoys indirect benefits from the
corporation's extra income. The economic effects of stock dividend increases, corporate pay
raises, and corporate work force expansion will eventually benefit consumers indirectly.
75. Jordan, 12 Preventive L. Rptr. at 6 (cited in note 3).
76. Congress described the Sentencing Commission as follows:
The United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") is an independent agency in
the judicial branch composed of seven voting and two non-voting, ex officio members. Its
principal purpose is to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal crimi-
nal justice system that will assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed guide-
lines prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes.
USSG ch. 1, part A- 1.
77. USSG §§ 8A1.2, comment. (3(k)), 8C2.5(f). This reward is in the form of credit given in
the culpability score determination. See id. § 8C2.5(g)(1). Although the Commission has
affirmatively set a minimum credit for compliance programs, courts have discretion to credit the
culpability score even beyond what the guidelines affirmatively require. See id § 8C4.11;
Swenson, Effective Program, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson eds., Compliance Programs §
4:02 at 5 (cited in note 6) (stating that the Commission "gave courts authority to consider a
further reduction on their oun").
78. Commentators often refer to these incentives as "carrots" and "sticks." See Oversight
on the U.S. Sentencing Commission and Guidelines for Organizational Sanctions, Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (1990); Wilkins, 3 Fed. Sent. Rptr. at 120 (cited in note 18); Jeffrey M.
Kaplan, Corporate Sentencing Guidelines: Overview, in Jeffrey M. Kaplan, Joseph E. Murphy,
and Winthrop M. Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs and the Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines: Preventing Criminal and Civil Liability §§ 3:06-3:10 (Clark Boardman Callaghan,
1993-95); Swenson, Remarks at United States Sentencing Commission Symposium (cited in note
18).
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allowing sentencing courts the flexibility necessary to promote good
corporate citizenship79 At the time of sentencing, the Guidelines
permit a court to reduce an offender's fine if the illicit conduct
occurred, notwithstanding the defendant having established an
"effective program to prevent and detect violations of law."8° Four
elements determine whether a company's program meets this
standard: (1) general effectiveness in preventing and detecting
violations of law; (2) due diligence; (3) the compliance context; and (4)
compliance with industry practice. 81
1. Preventing and Detecting Violations of Law
An effective program "means a program that has been reason-
ably designed, implemented, and enforced so that it generally will be
effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct."82 By defini-
tion, therefore, an effective program should prevent---or at the very
least detect-illegal conduct on the part of the business. If a compli-
ance program fails to detect wrongdoing within the company, how-
ever, a court may consider the company's "due diligence" and the
overall context of its operations to determine whether the program
may still be deemed effective.83
79. Swenson, Effective Program, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance
Programs § 4:06 at 15-19 (cited in note 6). See Swenson and Clark, 1 Corp. Conduct Q. at 1
(cited in note 3).
80. USSG §§ 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)), 8C2.5(f) (emphasis added); Swenson and Clark, 1
Corp. Conduct Q. at 1 (cited in note 3). Swenson comments that:
The definition of an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law reflects the
same basic approach the United States Sentencing Commission took in devising the or-
ganizational guidelines generally: a melding of specific requirements-aimed at ensur-
ing that sentencing discretion will be meaningfully guided and consistently exer-
cised-with general principles, to ensure that courts will have the flexibility necessary
to apply reasoned judgment to the sometimes unique issues and frequently complex
facts raised by federal organizational offenses.
Swenson, Effective Program, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs §
4:06 at 15 (cited in note 6).
81. Swenson characterizes these elements as a "four-part structure." Swenson, Effective
Program, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 4.06 at 15 (cited in
note 6). For a program to be effective, elements (1), (2), and (4) must be present to some degree.
The third element, based on the compliance context, provides the framework within which to
consider the existence or operation of the other elements. See notes 88-93 and accompanying
text.
82. USSG § 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)).
83. The Guidelines state that "[f]ailure to prevent or detect the instant offense, by itself,
does not mean that the program was not effective. The hallmark of an effective program to
prevent and detect violations of law is that the organization exercised due diligence in seeking
to prevent and detect criminal conduct by its employees and other agents." Id.
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2. Due Diligence
Under the Guidelines, an evaluation of "due diligence" requires
a court to consider seven factors:
(1) The organization must have established compliance
standards and procedures to be followed by its employees and other
agents that are reasonably capable of reducing the prospect of
criminal conduct.
(2) Specific individual(s) within high-level personnel of the
organization must have been assigned overall responsibility to oversee
compliance with such standards and procedures.
(3) The organization must have used due care not to
delegate substantial discretionary authority to individuals whom the
organization knew, or should have known through the exercise of due
diligence, had a propensity to engage in illegal activities.
(4) The organization must have taken steps to
communicate effectively its standards and procedures to all employees
and other agents.84
(5) The organization must have taken reasonable steps to
achieve compliance with its standards.85
(6) The standards must have been consistently enforced
through appropriate disciplinary mechanisms, including, as
appropriate, discipline of individuals responsible for the failure to
detect an offense. Adequate discipline of individuals responsible for
an offense is a necessary component of enforcement; however, the
form of discipline that will be appropriate will be case-specific.
(7) After an offense has been detected, the organization
must have taken all reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the
offense and to prevent further similar offenses-including any
,necessary modification to its program to prevent and detect violations
of law.86
A program which meets these requirements is likely to be
found "effective."87
84. Some examples of this would be to require participation in training programs or
disseminate publications that explain in a practical manner what is required.
85. The organization could utilize monitoring and auditing systems reasonably designed
to detect criminal conduct by its employees and other agents or have in place and publicize a
reporting system whereby employees and other agents could report criminal conduct by others
within the organization without fear of retribution.
86. USSG § 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)(5)).




3. The Compliance Context
In determining whether a program is effective, the Sentencing
Guidelines also direct courts to consider the context within which the
compliance program operates. Specifically, "[tihe precise actions
necessary for an effective program to prevent and detect violations
will depend upon a number of factors."8 These factors include the
"size of the organization,"89 the "[1]ikehhood that certain offenses may
occur because of the nature of its business,"90 and the "[p]rior history
of the organization."91 Taken together, these factors determine how
formal the company's program must be, which areas of the business it
must cover, 92 and whether the company should be on notice that mis-
conduct is likely to occur.93
4. Compliance with Industry Practice
The final element of an effective program concerns the com-
pany's compliance with industry practice: "An organization's failure
to incorporate and follow applicable industry practice or the
standards called for by any applicable governmental regulation
weighs against a finding of an effective program to prevent and detect
88. Id.
89. Id. § 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)(i)).
90. Id. § 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)(ii)).
91. Id. § 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)(iii)).
92. The Commentary states that:
For example, if an organization handles toxic substances, it must have established stan-
dards and procedures designed to ensure that those substances are properly handled at
all times, If an organization employs sales personnel who have flexibility in setting
prices, it must have established standards and procedures designed to prevent and de-
tect price-fixing. If an organization employs sales personnel who have flexibility to rep-
resent the material characteristics of a product, it must have established standards and
procedures designed to prevent fraud.
Id. § 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)(ii)).
93. Swenson notes that:
The relevant portion of the commentary states, "An organization's prior history may in-
dicate types of offenses that it should have taken actions to prevent." The commentary
then continues with an admonition: "Recurrence of misconduct similar to that which an
organization has previously committed casts doubt on whether it took all reasonable
steps to prevent such misconduct." This language not only reinforces the idea that past
history helps show which violations the compliance program must particularly seek to
prevent and detect, it strongly suggests that-because the organization's compliance
program will be held accountable for repeat violations-the circumstances surrounding
past violations should carefully be examined to see how to guard against future viola-
tions.
Swenson, Effectice Program, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs §
4:06 at 17-18 (cited in note 6).
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violations of law."94  This element requires companies to check the
standards governing their industry constantly and to ensure that
their compliance efforts conform with other similarly situated
programs.9 5
III. PROTECTION FOR COMPLIANCE MATERIALS
Since the promulgation of the Guidelines, more companies
have instituted compliance programs to prevent and detect violations
of law.96 Accordingly, more companies now face the dilemma posed by
the disclosure risks such programs create. In order to protect materi-
als arising from these programs, businesses can sometimes rely on
common-law evidentiary privileges, the work product doctrine, or
state privilege statutes. Because these protections are narrowly
drawn and lack certainty, however, it is arguable that they
exacerbate-rather than resolve-the dilemma posed by compliance
programs. The inadequacy of existing protections becomes apparent
once their origins and theoretical foundations are better understood.
A. Common Law Evidentiary Privileges
Traditionally, courts have created evidentiary privileges 97
when the potential harm caused by disclosure of information out-
94. USSG § 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)).
95. Swenson comments that "the apparent intent of this final portion of the definition is to
encourage companies to look outside the guidelines' general requirements in designing compli-
ance programs. Companies must know what the relevant industry and regulatory standards
are and make sure their own programs' features do not fall demonstrably short." Swenson,
Effective Program, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 4:06 at 18
(cited in note 6). Furthermore, he states that:
[W]hile the guideline commentary literally read seems to require adherence to industry
practice, it seems obvious that what the Sentencing Commission had in mind was that
companies' compliance standards and procedures be at least as good as prevailing indus-
try practice. It is doubtful the Commission intended to stifle innovation that could fos-
ter effective approaches for individual companies or for organizations generally.
Id. § 4:06 at 18 n.8.
96. See Apel, Remarks at United States Sentencing Commission Symposium (cited in note
4). According to Apel's data, 20% of all organizations reported that they added compliance
programs because of their awareness of the Sentencing Guidelines. An additional 40% reported
that the Guidelines "'influenced' them to either bolster existing efforts or commence new
compliance efforts." Id.
97. Privileges tend to fall into two categories: those that protect relationships and those
that protect privacy. Under the first category, courts create privileges in order to foster and
protect relationships, assuming that unfettered communication will not occur unless protected.
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weighs the adverse consequences of nondisclosure.98 Because eviden-
tiary privileges often exclude highly probative evidence, however,
courts do not favor such privileges and tend to construe them
narrowly.99
Within this framework, a few courts have attempted to pro-
mote compliance programs'00 by protecting compliance materials from
discovery. 1 1 Judges have achieved this result through a variety of
means, including the attorney-client privilege,1 2 the work product
doctrine, 10 3 and the self-evaluative privilege.104 None of these doc-
trines, however, definitively protects compliance materials from dis-
closure.
98. Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., 23 Federal Practice and Procedure:
Evidence § 5422 at 668 (West, 1980). This rationale is evident in privileges created to protect
relationships: The attorney-client privilege, the priest-penitent privilege, and the privilege
protecting marital communications all emphasize the importance of protecting the underlying
relationship. Professor Wigmore outlined the factors that a court should look to before granting
such a privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory mainte-
nance of the relation between the parties. (3) The relation must be one which in the
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered. (4) The injury that would in-
ure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
John Henry Wigmore, 8 Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2285 at 527 (John T.
McNaughton, ed., 1961).
The second category of privileges-those created to protect privacy interests--emphasizes
an individuars right of privacy over all other rights. Privileges falling within this category
assume that an individual has a privacy right that may only be overcome in exceptional
circumstances. See Wright and Graham, 23 Evidence § 5422 at 671-73 (cited in note 98) (stating
that in such cases "the disclosure is itself thought to be wrong").
99. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979) ('Evidentiary privileges in litigation
are not favored, and even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper
circumstances.").
100. Like compliance programs, audits may yield many potentially problematic materials.
Because of this, most courts and legislatures treat compliance audit materials in the same way
they treat compliance program materials.
101. See University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d at 337; Gray v. Board of Higher
Education, City of New York, 692 F.2d 901, 904-05, 908 (2d Cir. 1982); Crazy Eddie Securities
Litigation, 792 F. Supp. at 205 (finding that self-improvement through uninhibited self-analysis
and evaluation is in the public interest); Granger v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 116 F.R.D.
507, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Roberts, 107 F.R.D. at 685; Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250-51.
102. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 383; Wigmore, 8 Evidence § 2292 at 554 (cited in note 98);
Note, Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection in a Utilitarian World: An Argument for
Recomparison, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1697, 1698-1700 (1995).
103. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947) (stating that a lawyer's work is
entitled to freedom from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel). See also
FRCP 26(b)(3) (stating that "the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other representations of a party
concerning the litigation" when ordering discovery).
104. See Part III.A.3.
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1. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest and most widely
applied doctrine protecting confidential communications.101 Although
originally grounded on the belief that an attorney should be permitted
to "keep the secrets confided in him by his client and thus preserve
his honor,"'08 today most courts justify the privilege on the premise
that it encourages clients to make full disclosure to their lawyer, thus
enabling counsel to act in an informed and effective manner.107
Not all communications between an attorney and client,
however, qualify for protection. The privilege is limited to communi-
cations made in confidence to an attorney by the client for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice. 08 Even when the privilege applies, it is
105. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; Wigmore, 8 Evidence § 2290 at 542 (cited in note 98).
106. In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
107. The Supreme Court explained the purpose of the attorney-client privilege in Upjohn:
Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being
fully informed by the client.
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
108. See id.; United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass.
1950). In order for the privilege to apply, the communication must meet several requirements:
(1) [T]he asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to
whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subor-
dinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the com-
munication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b)
without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358-59. See United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d
1437, 1441-42 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing United Shoe with approval); In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94,
98-99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (following United Shoe); United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th
Cir. 1982) (referring to United Shoe as the "classic test for application of the attorney-client
privilege").
Furthermore, the context of the communication is often important in determining whether
the communication is protected:
It is generally accepted that communications with in-house counsel who also hold a
business position within the corporation will be privileged where the attorney is acting
in a legal capacity. Where there is the potential for conflict, however, between in-house
counsel's desire to see the company prosper and counsel's professional and legal
obligations, the Second Circuit has suggested that "[i]n such cases, the wiser course may
be to hire counsel with no other connection to the corporation to conduct investigations."
In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 491 (2d Cir. 1982). Otherwise, a court may find the
[attorney-client] privilege inapplicable because of in-house counsel's handling of the
matter.
John R. Wing and Harris J. Yale, Grand Jury Practice, in Otto G. Obermaier and Robert G.
Morvillo, eds., White Collar Crime: Business and Regulatory Offense § 8.04[2] at 8-39 n.64 (Law
Journal Seminars-Press, 1990) (citations omitted).
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narrowly construed'0 9 and may be waived by disclosure to a third
party,110 inadvertent testimony at a deposition,"' or production of
privileged documents."2
a. Upjohn Co. v. United States
Upjohn Co. v. United States," 3 the Supreme Court's seminal
decision interpreting the attorney-client privilege in a corporate
context, provides a preliminary framework for analyzing when com-
pliance materials may be protected from disclosure. Upjohn involved
a company that directed both corporate and outside counsel to inves-
tigate allegations that its employees had bribed foreign officials to
secure contracts.14  The attorneys interviewed corporate managers,
and circulated a questionnaire asking for details about the alleged
transactions."15 Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
demanded production of all documents relating to the transactions,
including the interview records and questionnaires generated by
109. See Spectrum Systems Int'l Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1059 (N.Y.
1991) (stating that the attorney-client privilege "must be narrowly construed and its application
must be consistent with the purposes underlying the immunity"); Smith v. Harmon Group, Inc.,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 242 at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y.) ("The attorney-client privilege is narrowly
construed because it obstructs the truth-finding process."); Wigmore, 8 Evidence § 2291 at 554
(cited in note 98) (arguing that the privilege "ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest
possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle").
110. See Steen v. First Nat'l Bank of Sarcoxie, Mo., 298 F. 36, 41-42 (8th Cir. 1924) (holding
that defendants could not invoke the privilege to prevent disclosure of confidential communica-
tions after prior voluntary disclosure of the information at a preliminary hearing); Knaust
Brothers v. Goldschlag, 34 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (asserting that substantial disclosure
through oral testimony given in examinations before trial and in bill of particulars furnished to
defendant pursuant to court order constituted a waiver of attorney-client privilege).
111. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that inadvertent
disclosure due to bureaucratic error waived attorney-client privilege); White v. Thacker, 78 F.
862, 865 (5th Cir. 1897) (admitting testimony by attorney where the client in deposition had
offered letters written by attorney). In the corporate context, however, inadvertent production
of documents often will not waive the privilege, particularly when the party is required to
produce a large number of documents at the same time. See Transamerica Computer Co., Inc.
v. International Business Machines Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 647-51 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that
inadvertent disclosure "compelled" by accelerated discovery proceedings did not waive attorney-
client privilege); International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 471 F.2d 507, 509-11
(2d Cir. 1972) (stating that disclosure of documents pursuant to a court order did not constitute
waiver of attorney-client privilege).
112. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(holding that the corporation waived the attorney-client privilege by producing documents
pursuant to grand jury subpoenas). When applied in a corporate setting, the attorney-client
privilege attaches to the corporate entity and not to the individual employee who communicates
with corporate counsel. The corporation may determine whether to assert the privilege,
irrespective of what the employee wishes to do.
113. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
114. Id. at 386-87.
115. Id.
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Upjohn's internal investigation." 6  Upjohn refused to release the
documents, arguing that they were protected under the attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine.1 7
The district court rejected Upjohn's argument and directed
disclosure to the IRS."5 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit summarily dis-
posed of the work product claim" 9 and held that the attorney-client
privilege only extends to communications made between attorneys
and those "control group" employees "who play a substantial role in
deciding and directing the corporation's response to the legal advice
given."'120 Because the Sixth Circuit's analysis dramatically narrowed
the scope of the attorney-client privilege in corporate settings, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider this issue.121 In revers-
ing, the Supreme Court found the "control group" test to be inconsis-
tent with the premise underlying the attorney-client privilege:
The control group test adopted by the court below ... frustrates the very pur-
pose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant informa-
tion by [noncontrol group] employees of the client to attorneys seeking to ren-
der legal advice to the client corporation. The attorney's advice will also fre-
quently be more significant to noncontrol group members than to those who of-
ficially sanction the advice, and the control group test makes it more difficult
to convey full and frank legal advice to the employees who will put into effect
the client corporation's policy. 122
The Court also recognized that, since lower-level employees may
"embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties," such employees
must be allowed to give counsel relevant information regarding those
difficulties. 23 Thus, the Court concluded that the control group test
undermines the judicial system by discouraging knowledgeable em-
ployees from speaking with corporate counsel. 24
116. Id. at 387-88.
117. Id. at 388.
118. Id.
119. The court found the work product doctrine inapplicable to IRS summonses. Id. at 389.
120. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1979). In an earlier case,
one district court endorsed a similar approach:
[Tihe most satisfactory solution.., is that if the employee making the communication,
of whatever rank he may be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part
in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the
attorney, or if he is an authorized member of a body or group which has that authority,
then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the
lawyer and the privilege would apply.
City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
121. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386.
122. Id. at 392.
123. Id. at 391.
124. Id. at 392.
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Although the Court rejected the control group test, Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion declined to establish a new standard for
operation of the privilege in a corporate setting; instead, Upjohn left
the lower courts to determine application of the privilege on a case-by-
case basis. 125  In its aftermath, some courts 12 6 have interpreted
Upjohn's rejection of the control group test to constitute implicit
endorsement of a "subject matter" test for resolving the scope of the
attorney-client privilege in corporate settings. 127
b. The Subject Matter Test
Under the subject matter test,12 8 five elements must be present
for the attorney-client privilege to apply: (1) the communication must
be made for the purpose of securing legal advice; 29 (2) the employee
making the communication must do so at the direction of a supervi-
sor;1 30 (3) the direction must be given by the supervisor to obtain legal
advice for the corporation;' 3' (4) the subject matter of the communica-
tion must be within the scope of the employee's corporate duties;132
and (5) the communication may not be disseminated beyond those
persons who need to know the information. 133 Although most courts
125. Though Upjohn effectively negated the control group test on the federal level, a few
state courts still apply that test when faced with attorney-client privilege issues. For example,
one year after the Upjohn ruling, the Illinois Supreme Court looked to the control group test in
finding that reports prepared by general counsel during interviews with employees were not
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432
N.E.2d 250, 257-58 (Ill. 1982).
126. See generally Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate Client: Where Do
We Go After Upjohn?, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 665, 674-83 (1983) (describing the various subject matter
tests applied by the courts).
127. The Supreme Court has neither rejected the subject matter test nor formally approved
it as the standard for applying the attorney-client privilege in a corporate setting. Until the
Court affirmatively delineates the circumstances under which the subject matter test applies,
corporations will ordinarily keep privileged communication at the management level unless
circumstances mandate differently.
128. See, for example, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., v. Decker, 423 F. 2d 487, 491-92 (7th
Cir. 1970); Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 608-10 (8th Cir. 1977); Sylgab
Steel & Wire Corp. v. Inoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 456-57 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
129. Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 609; Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 490.
130. Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 609; Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 491.
131. Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 609; Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 491.
132. Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 609; Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 491-92.
133. Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 609. See also Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp., 62 F.R.D.
at 456 (adopting the Harper & Row analysis); Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425, 428
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (same); Jack B. Weinstein, Margaret A. Berger, and Joseph M. McLaughlin, 2
Weinstein's Evidence 503(a)[04] at 503-41 (Matthew Bender, 1996) ('If the same statements
have been made ... to third persons on other occasions this is persuasive that like
communications to the lawyer were not intended as confidential.").
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routinely apply the subject matter test,134 this standard does not af-
ford complete protection to compliance materials. For example, the
corporation risks waiving the privilege by disseminating compliance
results too broadly among its employees. 135  Broad dissemination,
however, may be needed to educate employees and avoid future mis-
conduct.136 Similarly, the company's own investors are likely to expect
reasonable disclosure. 137 Some companies have therefore sought to
supplement the attorney-client privilege by looking to the work prod-
uct doctrine.
2. The Work Product Doctrine
The work product doctrine protects materials that contain the
"mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney."138 This doctrine is similar to the attorney-client privilege in
The factors articulated in Upjohn are similar to those listed in Diversified Industries and
Harper & Row. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394. However, the Upjohn Court declined to adopt the
subject matter test as its own.
134. See Note, 81 Mich. L. Rev. at 674-83 (cited in note 126).
135. Waiver in such case will turn on the fifth factor of the subject matter test-the com-
munication may not be disseminated beyond those who needed to know the information. See
note 133 and accompanying text. For example, management risks waiving the privilege if it
divulges the results of an internal compliance audit in employee training materials. Compare
James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 141-42 (D. Del. 1982) (documents were
privileged because they were not broadly circulated or used as training materials).
136. Arguably, only those involved in the misconduct need to know the information regard-
ing the misconduct, as required by the subject matter test. In some circumstances, however, a
company may wish to publish the confidential information to more than just those involved. For
example, if misconduct occurs in one branch of a multinational corporation, management may
wish to share confidential information with all of its employees worldwide in order to avoid
similar misconduct elsewhere.
137. This situation has led one commentator to remark that the potential protection of the
attorney-client privilege has become even more problematic:
since invocation of that protection would likely void the benefits otherwise available
from having the compliance program in the first place. In order to argue that the
company does not deserve to be indicted or punished because it had a genuine or
"effective" compliance program, it is necessary to put the bona fides of that program in
issue. In doing so, the company incurs a high risk of waiving privilege protection for any
compliance program activities, even if they were run by legal counsel.
Joseph E. Murphy, Self-Evaluative Privilege Draft Legislation: The Federal Organizational
Compliance Program Improvement Act, 1 Corp. Conduct Q. 8, 8 (1991). See Reed Abelson,
Offering the Last Word, N.Y. Times C1 (Sept. 3, 1996) ("Not only is it important to emphasize
the investigator's need for independence and an array of skills... but companies are also likely
to find that investors and other interested parties will expect a fair disclosure of much of the
evidence found during the inquiry.").
138. FRCP 26(b)(3). Justice Murphy addressed the rationale of the work product doctrine
as follows:
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the advancement
of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In performing
his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper
1997] CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 29
that it protects some communications between attorney and client.
The doctrine differs from the attorney-client privilege, however, in
three important respects: First, the work product doctrine requires
that the communication be reduced to "tangible form" before the in-
formation will be protected. 139 Second, work product doctrine protec-
tion is limited to those matters and discussions that relate to pending
litigation. 140 Third, the work product doctrine is not an absolute bar
to disclosure.
The work product doctrine first won recognition in Hickman v.
Taylor,'4 when the Supreme Court declared that disclosing an attor-
ney's personal writings about the statements of potential witnesses
would contravene public policy.12 The Court refused to create an
absolute privilege, however, ruling instead that a person seeking
discovery could obtain an attorney's work product by establishing
"adequate reasons to justify production."143
Under the work product doctrine courts distinguish between
ordinary work product and opinion work product.44 Ordinary work
preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he con-
siders to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan
his strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and the
necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurispru-
dence to promote justice and to protect their clients' interests. This work is reflected, of
course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impres-
sions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways .... Were such
materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in
writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would
not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in
the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal
profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of jus-
tice would be poorly served.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
139. The language of the rule states that "a party may obtain discovery of documents and
tangible things... only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial
need...." FRCP 26(b)(3).
140. Id. In order for a work product to be considered "in anticipation of litigation," a legal
or regulatory proceeding must be "imminent," SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 92
F.R.D. 65, 66 (N.D. Ga. 1981), and "fairly foreseeable," Enforce Administrative Subpoenas of
SEC v. Coopers & Lybrand, 98 F.R.D. 414, 416 (S.D. Fla. 1982). The rule does not require,
however, that the action commence before the doctrine may be asserted. See Sneider v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 91 F.R.D. 1, 6 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (holding that the doctrine protected
memoranda prepared up to six years before the commencement of the litigation).
The attorney-client privilege has no such requirement.
141. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Subsequently, Congress codified the doctrine in Rule 26(b)(3) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
142. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510.
143. Id. at 512.
144. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 399-402; Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-13; In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 841-42 (8th Cir. 1973); Valukas, Stauffer, and Murphy, Threshold
Considerations, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 5:23 at 34 (cited
in note 8).
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product is generally discoverable and includes objective facts of the
case and third-party statements. 145 Opinion work product covers
materials such as the attorney's mental impressions of the case,
strategies for litigation or settlement, and legal conclusions. 146
Opinion work product is only discoverable upon a showing of
extraordinary need.147
Materials shielded by the work product doctrine may lose their
protected status through waiver. 48 Waiver ordinarily occurs in one of
three ways: (1) through disclosure of the information to anyone who
lacks a common interest; 149 (2) when the work product was prepared
to further a crime or fraud;150 or (3) when the work product is used to
refresh a witness's memory under Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, either before or during trial.15,
Given these gaps in both the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine, a few courts have begun to rely on a newly
established self-evaluative privilege to protect compliance materials
from disclosure. As presently construed, however, this privilege also
falls short of providing adequate protection for compliance informa-
tion.
3. The Self-Evaluative Privilege
Several courts have recognized a "self-evaluative privilege152
that serves to shield information from discovery when public policy
145. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 724-26 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Valukas,
Stauffer, and Murphy, Threshold Considerations, in Kaplan, Murphy, and Swenson, eds.,
Compliance Programs § 5:23 at 34-35 (cited in note 8) C" 'Ordinary work-product,' such as
witness statements which do not reveal the attorney's mental processes, receive less protection
than does opinion work-product.").
146. Valukas, Stauffer, and Murphy, Threshold Considerations, in Kaplan, Murphy, and
Swenson, eds., Compliance Programs § 5:23 at 34 (cited in note 8). See Pappas v. Holloway, 787
P.2d 30, 37-39 (Wash. 1990) (describing various approaches taken by different courts regarding
opinion work product).
147. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401 (finding that opinion work-product cannot be compelled
"simply on a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue
hardship").
148. See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1428-30 (3d
Cir. 1991) (discussing waiver of the work product privilege).
149. In re Leslie Fay Companies, Inc. Securities Litigation, 152 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
150. In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 337-39 (8th Cir. 1977).
151. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 615-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Because of this rule, attorneys should be
cautious when preparing witnesses using writings that may contain mental impressions.
152. Courts refer to this privilege by several different names. Tharp v. Sivyer Steel Corp.,
149 F.R.D. 177, 179 n.5 (S.D. Iowa 1993). See, for example, Dowling, 971 F.2d at 425 (referring
to a "privilege of self-critical analysis"); In re Burlington Northern, Inc., 679 F.2d 762, 765 (8th
[Vol. 50:1
19971 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
outweighs the need for disclosure.153 The self-evaluative privilege is
intended to promote confidential self-analysis and self-criticism; it
often protects evaluations,54 recommendations for change, 155 and
internal reviews 5 6 against requests for disclosure.
This privilege arose in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 57
when a federal district judge recognized the need to protect certain
peer review findings and reports from civil discovery. In Bredice,
Doctors Hospital had established a committee to review hospital
procedures in selected cases involving patient deaths. 58 In a subse-
quent malpractice action against the hospital, plaintiff requested
access to various documents, including a report, generated by the
committee. 5 9 Although the requested documents almost certainly
contained information of great relevance to plaintiff, the district court
Cir. 1982) (finding a "self-critical subjective analysis privilege"); Pagano v. Oroville Hospital, 145
F.R.D. 683, 690 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (calling the privilege a "peer review privilege"); Hoffman v.
United Telecommunications, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 440, 442 (D. Kan. 1987) (remarking on the "'self-
evaluation' privilege"); Witten v. AH. Smith & Co., 100 F.R.D. 446, 449 (D. Md. 1984) (referring
to a "'critical self analysis' privilege"); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703, 705 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (finding a "privilege for confidential self-evaluative analysis"); Rosario v. New York Times
Co., 84 F.R.D. 626, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding a "qualified privilege of'self-examination' ").
153. See Granger, 116 F.R.D. at 508; Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250-51 (holding that the public
interest prevented discovery of hospital committee meetings); Allen and Hazelwood, 12 J. Corp.
L. at 378 (cited in note 5) (finding the self-evaluative privilege much more likely to be applied if
an internal investigation clearly furthers an important public interest); David P. Leonard,
Codifying a Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis, 25 Harv. J. Leg. 113, 116-18 (1988) (noting that
courts have recognized a limited privilege in several contexts because businesses may believe
that a "full and frank self-evaluation of their operations will be in the public interest"); Bush, 87
Nw. U. L. Rev. at 603 (cited in note 5) ('Many courts and commentators have recognized public
policy as a legitimate rationale for restricting broad pretrial discovery.").
154. See, for example, Nash v. City of Oakwood, Ohio, 90 F.R.D. 633, 637 (S.D. Ohio 1981)
(denying discovery of any "self-criticism" contained in applications, examinations, and written
criteria used to evaluate job applicants); Stevenson v. General Electric Co., 18 FEP Cases (CCH)
746 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (denying discovery of investigations into employee complaints on public
policy grounds).
155. See, for example, Sanday v. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 12 FEP Cases (BNA) 101 (W.D.
Pa. 1975) (extending the privilege to an employee's affirmative action plans).
156. See, for example, Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12801 at *2-
5 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding interviews of employees protected by the "self-critical analysis" privilege).
157. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970).
158. Id. at 249-50. This committee was formed pursuant to the requirements of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, id. at 250, which sought to standardize hospital
practices nationally. Id. Although the Commission lacks the authority to license hospitals, "it is
prestigious and can substantially affect the standing of hospitals on a professional basis.
Accreditation by the Commission can be gained only by following its recommendations." Id.
The sole purpose of the committee, as specified by the Commission, was to improve the care
and treatment of patients in the hospital. Id. This purpose was accomplished by a monthly
review of the hospital's clinical work, and included a "consideration of selected deaths, unim-
proved cases, infections, complications, errors in diagnosis, and results of treatment of
patients .... Id. (quoting Standards for Hospital Accreditation, Bulletin of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, No. 3 (Aug. 1953)).
159. Id. at 249-50.
32 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 50:1
protected the committee's minutes and reports from discovery by
creating a qualified privilege.160
The Bredice court based its holding on the public's interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of the hospital committee's delibera-
tions, 161 concluding that the committee prepared its reports with the
understanding that they would remain confidential.12 The court
reasoned that allowing this confidentiality to be compromised would
discourage hospital personnel from making full disclosure to future
internal investigators; the risk that statements might be admissible
in a future malpractice action would stifle cooperation. 163
The public policy concerns identified by Bredice are compelling,
but the self-evaluative privilege has not enjoyed widespread applica-
tion. 164 Consequently, it is of limited value. Because only a few com-
panies can definitively determine at the outset whether the privilege
will protect their compliance materials from disclosure, the premise
underlying the self-evaluative privilege remains unrealized; to be
effective, an evidentiary privilege must operate with certainty.165
160. Id. at 251.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 250.
163. Id. The court stated that:
Confidentiality is essential to effective functioning of these staff meetings; and these
meetings are essential to the continued improvement in the care and treatment of pa-
tients.... To subject these discussions and deliberations to the discovery process, with-
out a showing of exceptional necessity, would result in terminating such deliberations.
Constructive professional criticism cannot occur in an atmosphere of apprehension that
one doctor's suggestion will be used as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a mal-
practice suit.
Id.
Several commentators refer to this "atmosphere of apprehension" as a "chilling effect." See,
for example, Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1091-95 (1983);
Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege, the Self-Evaluative Report Privilege, and Diversified
Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 699, 722-25 (1979). The court left open the
possibility that the privilege might be waived if the documents were not intended to be confi-
dential, or if the confidentiality was breached by releasing the documents to a third party.
Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 251.
164. See Bush, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 603-614 (cited in note 5) (giving an historical overview
of the self-evaluative privilege and discussing limitations on its expansion). See also University
of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (rejecting a privilege to protect faculty peer
review notes in connection with discrimination claim). Murphy points out, however, that this
case is of limited scope because the communications were allegedly "part of the violation of law
at issue." Joseph E. Murphy, Supreme Court Recognizes Evaluative Privilege: But Is It Just
Personal? (forthcoming publication).
165. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 ("The attorney and client must be able to predict with some
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or
one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little
better than no privilege at all."); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The
Control .Group Test, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 424, 426 (1970).
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B. Legislative Protection for Audit Materials: Environmental
Audit Statutes
Given the absence of a reliable common-law shield for
compliance materials, some members of the business community be-
gan to seek legislative relief. For example, during the 1980s, when
state and federal governments encouraged greater corporate
responsibility and accountability by enacting and enforcing
environmental laws, many corporations began to conduct
environmental audits to assess their compliance with those laws.66
The potential liability stemming from ensuing disclosure risks
prompted some businesses to lobby for an evidentiary privilege
protecting compliance materials from disclosure. Fourteen states
responded by codifying an environmental self-evaluative privilege for
auditing corporations. 67 These state laws provide a preliminary
framework for a legislative solution to the disclosure dilemma posed
by internal compliance efforts.
The details of these statutes vary, but their fundamental
premise is that every environmentally sensitive business must be
encouraged to conduct internal audits,168 analyze its compliance with
environmental regulations, 169 remedy the problem, and report its
findings to its employees. 7°  Three main policies underlie
environmental privilege statutes. First, audits serve an important
public interest by reducing state regulatory and enforcement costs: If
corporations engage in effective self-policing, states will expend fewer
resources on regulatory agencies and related legal action. Second,
compliance audits are in the general public interest. 71 By
166. See Hunt and Wilkins, 16 Harv. Envir. L. Rev. at 365-67 (cited in note 39) ("[M]any
corporate managers are using environmental audits to make candid, comprehensive evaluations
of their facilities, operations, management procedures, and other internal risk management and
liability control functions."); Mary Ellen Kris and Gail L. Vannelli, Today's Criminal
Environmental Enforcement Program: Why You May Be Vulnerable and Why You Should
Guard Against Prosecution Through an Environmental Audit, 16 Colum. J. Envir. L. 227, 229-
32 (1991) (discussing the expansion of the federal criminal environmental enforcement
program).
167. See Oregon Passes an Environmental Audit Privilege, 23 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 453 (Feb.
12, 1994). See also note 27.
168. Goode, Cavanaugh, and Norris, 14 Preventive L. Rptr. at 36-37 (cited in note 28). See
Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.963(1).
169. Goode, Cavanaugh, and Norris, 14 Preventive L. Rptr. at 36-37 (cited in note 28). See
Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.963(1).
170. Goode, Cavanaugh, and Norris, 14 Preventive L Rptr. at 36-37 (cited in note 28). See
Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.963(1).
171. The Arkansas legislature adopted a statement declaring that "protection of the envi-
ronment is enhanced by the public's voluntary compliance with environmental laws and.., the
public will benefit from incentives to identify and remedy environmental compliance issues."
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encouraging audits, the government fosters a better environment 172
and promotes increased product safety, 173 more conscientious hiring
practices, 174 and more candid evaluations of internal activities. 75
Finally, by allowing these investigations to occur unimpeded by
liability threats, the government creates an opportunity for companies
to engage in "interactive compliance,"176 a process through which the
government and the corporation work together to find solutions to
compliance problems.
1. Statutory Requirements
Typically, these statutes protect materials arising from an
"environmental audit," which is defined as a "voluntary, internal and
comprehensive evaluation" of facilities or activities. 177 The privilege,
however, does not apply to any information which must be collected,
reported, or "otherwise made available to a regulatory agency" to
comply with federal, state, or local laws or regulations. 78 Further, the
privilege does not protect information that has been obtained through
1995 Ark. Acts 350 § 8-1-301. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126.5(1); 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws 359 §
9-802(a); Va. Code § 10.1-1198(B). But see Flanagan, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 567-70 (cited in
note 19) (concluding that self-critical analysis privilege has little effect on corporate conduct or
corporate investigations).
In addition to encouraging more companies starting to conduct audits, a privilege will also
influence corporations which presently conduct audits to expand those audits. See Survey at
2447 (cited in note 5) (finding that two-thirds of companies which now conduct audits would
expand their evaluations if penalties were eliminated).
172. See Illinois Bill Creating Privilege For Environmental Audits Wins Passage,
Prevention Corp. Liab. (BNA) 1 (Jan. 16, 1995). But see Jennifer Arlen, Shielding Audits Will
Aggravate Pollution Problems, Nat'l. L. J. at A23 (Oct. 3, 1994).
173. See Roberts, 107 F.R.D. at 683.
174. See University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d at 336-37 ('[C]onfidentiality is equally
critical in the faculty tenure selection process, in order that only the best qualified educators
become the 'lifeblood' of our institutions of higher learning.").
175. Granger, 116 F.R.D. at 508; Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250-51.
176. See Sigler and Murphy, Interactive Corporate Compliance at 143 (cited in note 12)
(stating that "specific legislation to permit compliance plans and programs to be used in defense
of private suits" helps to "enhance the cooperative atmosphere that leads to interactive compli-
ance").
177. 1995 Ark. Acts 350 § 8-1-302(3); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 415, § 5152.2(i); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-
3332(a); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 224.01-040(1)(a); Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.963(6)(a); Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. art. 4447cc § 3(a)(3) (Vernon, Supp. 1996); Utah R. Evid. 508(a)(5); Wyo. Stat. § 35-
11-1105(a)(i). See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126.5(2)(e) (" 'Voluntary self-evaluation' means a self-
initiated assessment, audit, or review, not otherwise expressly required by environmental
law ...". ).
178. 1995 Ark. Acts 350 § 8-1-305(a). See also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126.5(4)(a)-(b); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 415, § 5/52.2(h)(1); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3336(a); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 224.01-
040(6)(a); Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.963(5)(a); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art 4447cc, § 8(a)(1); Utah R.
Evid. 508(d)(6); Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-1105(d)(i).
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independent monitoring179 or otherwise through an independent
source. 8 ' The statutes ordinarily protect materials included in an
"environmental audit report."'1' This report may include objective
material, such as photographs, maps, charts, surveys, and electroni-
cally recorded information, as well as subjective material, including
opinions and conclusions. 82
Most privilege statutes suggest, rather than mandate, the
types of materials that may be included in an audit report. 183
Companies are thereby allowed some latitude in determining the
content of their environmental audits. A business assumes a risk by
disregarding these suggestions, however, as courts are likely to look
to the statutory criteria in deciding whether the business conducted
the audit "with reasonable diligence."'184
179. 1995 Ark. Acts 350 § 8-1-305(b); Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.963(5)(b); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 4447cc, § 8(a)(2).
180. 1995 Ark. Acts 350 § 8-1-305(c); Or. Rev. Stat. §468.963(5)(c); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 4447cc, § 8(a)(3); Utah R. Evid. 508(d)(8). This limitation on the privilege is similar to the
"independent source" doctrine in criminal procedure. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S.
533, 537 (1988) (doctrine permits introduction of "evidence initially discovered during, or as a
consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities tainted by
the initial illegality").
181. 1995 Ark. Acts 350 § 8-1-303(b); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126.5(3); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
415, § 5/52.2(b); Ind. Code Ann. § 13-28-4-1; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3333(a) ("audit report"); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 224.01-040(3); Miss. Code § 49-2-71(1) (1990 & Supp. 1996) ("environmental
self-evaluation report"); Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.963(2); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4447cc, § 5(a);
Utah R. Evid. 508(a)(3); Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-1105(c).
182. For example, the Kansas statute states, "[ain audit report may include the following
supporting information, if collected or developed for the primary purpose and in the course of an
audit: field notes and records of observations, opinions, suggestions, conclusions, drafts, memo-
randa, drawings, photographs, computer-generated or electronically recorded information,
maps, charts, graphs and surveys." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3332(b). See 1995 Ark. Acts 350 § 8-1-
302(4)(A); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126.5(2)(b); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 415, § 5/52.2(i); Or. Rev. Stat. §
468.963(6)(b); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4447cc, § 4(c); Utah R. Evid. 508(a)(3); Wyo. Stat. §
35-11-1105(a)(ii).
It may also include any materials prepared by the auditor as a result of the audit. For
example, the Illinois statute provides that "[ain environmental audit report, when completed,
may have... [a]n audit report prepared by the auditor, which may include the scope of the
audit, the information gained in the audit, conclusions, and recommendations, together with
exhibits and appendices." Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 415, § 5/52.1(i)(1). See 1995 Ark. Acts 350 § 8-1-
302(4)(B)(1)-(4); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3332(b)(1).
183. The Arkansas statute declares that an audit report "may include: (A) field notes,
records of observations, findings, opinions, suggestions, conclusions, drafts, memoranda, draw-
ings, photographs, computer generated or electronically recorded information, maps, charts,
graphs, and surveys collected or developed for the primary purpose of preparing an environ-
mental audit; and (B) fain audit report prepared by the auditor .... 1995 Ark. Acts 350 § 8-1-
302(4)(A)-(B) (emphasis added).
184. Id. § 8-1-307(a)(3)(D). Several of the statutes also require the corporation to label the
audit materials "Environmental Audit Report: Privileged Document" before the privilege will
apply. See, for example, id. at § 8-1-302(4); Idaho Code § 9-803(4) (Supp. 1996); Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 415, § 5/52.2(i); Ind. Code Ann. § 13-11-2-69; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 224.040(1)(b); 1996 Mich.
Legis. Serv. 132(b) (West); 1996 N.H. Laws ch. 4(V); Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.963(6)(b); Wyo. Stat. §
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2. Scope of the Privilege
The privilege statutes generally protect environmental audit
reports from discovery in "any civil, criminal, or administrative pro-
ceeing."185  This language, however, is somewhat misleading.
Because federal courts are not always bound to honor state eviden-
tiary privileges, 186 the environmental privilege statutes only preclude
discovery in actions before state courts. 187 Accordingly, the statutes
should be treated as if they protect audits from discovery only in state
civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings, and in federal actions
when the state law provides the rule of decision. 188
At least one statute makes the audit reports subject to discov-
ery but declares that they shall not be admissible in any civil, crimi-
nal, or administrative legal action. 89 In many situations, this stan-
dard effectively eliminates an important benefit of the privilege: even
without admissibility, disclosure of the report may prompt a criminal
prosecution, regulatory action, or civil suit. For example, a corporate
audit may reveal that an employee illegally deposited toxic waste in a
landfill. If an audit report is discoverable but not admissible, a
government agency may use the information gained from the report to
gather evidence which falls outside of the privilege and then charge
35-11-1105(a)(ii). Further, as a practical matter, if non-document materials such as videotapes
or computer disks are included as part of the audit report, those items should also be
individually labeled to protect the company if they are separated from the rest of the report.
185. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 224.01-040(3). See also Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.963(2); Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 13-25-126.5(3); Ind. Code Ann. § 13-28-4-1(3); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 415, § 5/52.2(b); Wyo.
Stat. § 35-11-1105(c); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4447cc, § 5(b)(1)-(3); 1995 Ark. Acts 350 § 8-
1-303(b); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3333(a).
186. Federal courts evaluate privileges "in the light of reason and experience." FRE 501.
Within this context, state privileges enjoy limited application: "[]n civil actions and proceed-
ings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be determined in accordance with State law." Id. While a federal court might consider
state statutory privileges in a request for document production, it is not bound by them. See
Memorial Hospital v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Because state law does not
supply the rule of decision as to this claim, the district court was not required to apply state law
in determining whether the material.., is privileged."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 596 F.2d
630, 632 (4th Cir. 1979) (refusing to follow New York state statute regarding release of tax
information).
187. Though federal courts often recognize state evidentiary privileges, see, for example, In
re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992); Memorial Hospital, 664 F.2d at 1061; Lora v. Board
of Education, 74 F.R.D. 565, 569 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), state privilege statutes should be treated as if they only affect state regulatory agencies,
state attorney generals' offices, and civil litigants bringing suit in state courts.
188. See note 187.
189. "An audit report shall be subject to discovery procedures but shall be privileged and
shall not be admissible as evidence in any legal action in any civil, criminal or administrative
proceeding .. " Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3333(a).
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the corporation with illegal dumping. Consequently, unless a statu-
tory privilege provides protections commensurate with the risk of
prosecution, its safeguard will be illusory.
3. Other Requirements
a. The Business Must Attempt to Remedy the Problem
Most of the statutes explicitly require the company to correct
expeditiously any problems discovered during the audit.190 Indeed,
this requirement is probably implicit in all the statutes, as the
privilege is primarily designed to encourage compliance with
environmental laws. Thus, if a business conducts the audit without
attempting to remedy the violations that are identified, a court will
likely find bad faith or fraudulent purpose.
b. The Corporation Must Have a Program to Prevent and
Detect Environmental Violations
Presently, Kansas is the only state that makes the privilege
contingent upon whether the corporation has established a program
to prevent and detect violations of law.19' Because of the prevention
and detection requirements in the United States Sentencing
Guidelines for Organizations92 and the anticipated United States
Sentencing Guidelines for Environmental Violations,193 however, this
contingency may become a more common requirement in other stat-
utes.
4. Limitations on the Privilege
To protect against abuse, evaluative-privilege statutes often
qualify the privilege and allow the audit report to be discovered in
certain situations. In theory, these limitations help dissuade corpora-
tions from asserting the privilege in bad faith or for illegal purposes.
Because of these limitations, however, fewer corporations are likely to
190. 1995 Ark. Acts 350 §§ 8-1-307(a)(3)(D), 8.1-308(a)(3)(D); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-
126.5(3)(b)(I)(B); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3334(d)(4); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 224.01-040(4)(c)(3); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 468.963(3)(d); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4447cc, § 7(a)(3); Utah R. Evid.
508(d)(5); Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-1105(c)(iv).
191. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3334(d)(2).
192. See USSG § 8C2.5(f).
193. These guidelines are still being considered by the Commission.
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assume the disclosure risk inherent to a compliance audit.'94 The
limitations can be divided into five basic categories: waiver,
continued non-compliance, danger to public health, fraud, and
compelling circumstances.
a. Waiver
A company may affirmatively waive the privilege and allow
discovery of the audit materials. 195 Further, because a corporation has
a duty to take reasonable measures to keep privileged documents
confidential, waiver might also occur unintentionally if a corporation
responds to discovery by inadvertently sending an unlabeled copy of
the report.196
b. Continued Non-Compliance
The statutes provide that, if the company discovers environ-
mental violations and fails to begin remedying them, the audit mate-
rials will not be privileged. 197 This limitation reflects the policy that
corporations should conduct audits with the intention of correcting
problems. 98 Consequently, the business must begin to rectify envi-
ronmental violations before they have been independently discovered
by others outside the company.
c. Present or Impending Danger to Public Health
If a judge determines that the information in the audit report
"demonstrates a clear, present, and impending danger to the public
health or the environment in areas outside of the facility property,"
the report will not be privileged. 99 This limitation reflects the theory
underlying the environmental audit statutes: Corporations may pro-
tect compliance information from third parties as long as a problem is
194. While their numbers are likely small, a few corporations prefer to assume
optimistically that no illegal conduct occurs in their organization rather than uncover small
violations that might be subject to discovery because of these privilege limitations.
195. See, for example, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126.5(3)(a); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
4447cc, § 6(a).
196. See United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 741 n.13 (10th Cir. 1990) (reviewing cases
where inadvertent disclosure led to waiver of the privilege); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980
(finding that inadvertent disclosure of attorney-client communications will waive privilege). See
also note 184.
197. See, for example, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126.5(3)(b); Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.963(3)(d).
198. See note 86 and accompanying text.
199. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126.5(3)(e). See Utah R. Evid. 508.
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discovered and addressed before rising to crisis level. When the
problem becomes a threat to public health and safety, however, the
court will allow the information to be discovered.
d. Fraud
Not surprisingly, the privilege may not be asserted for fraudu-
lent or criminal purposes.200 In this regard, courts will likely consider
an audit conducted in bad faith to be evidence of fraud.
e. Compelling Circumstances
The most ambiguous and potentially troublesome limitation on
the environmental audit privilege is the "compelling circumstances"
exception. Under this exception, a judge may suspend the privilege if
"compelling circumstances exist that make it necessary to admit the
environmental audit report into evidence or that make it necessary to
subject the environmental audit report to discovery procedures." 20 1
The statutes, however, do not define what constitutes "compelling"
circumstances. Thus, if a judge reads this exception too broadly, the
statutory privilege may offer no more protection than the common law
self-evaluative privilege. 20 2
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO PROTECTING COMPLIANCE MATERIALS
Given these sporadic judicial and legislative attempts to pro-
tect compliance materials, companies remain in the difficult position
of having to decide whether to risk establishing a compliance program
200. See, for example, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126.5(3)(d); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 224.01-
040(4)(c)(1), (d)(1); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 468.963(3)(b)(A), 468.963(3)(c)(A). See Alan Stone, Note,
Attorney-Client Privilege and the Crime-Fraud Exception: Rejection of a Specific Intent
Requirement in In re Sealed Case, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 1061 (1986) (discussing application of the
crime-fraud exception upon prima facie evidence of fraud).
201. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126.5(3)(c).
202. See note 165 and accompanying text. Ordinarily, the term "compelling circumstances"
should limit such judicial inroads.
Because some jurisdictions have not defined what circumstances are "compelling," the
decision whether to apply the privilege to a particular situation may be left to the judge's
discretion. See In the Matter of Asbestos H Consolidated Pretrial, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2917,
*2 (N.D. Ill.) ("It will be in the court's discretion to determine whether compelling circumstances
exist .... ); People v. Downey, 454 N.W.2d 235, 239 (Mich. 1990) (listing various factors that
have been found to constitute compelling circumstances); State v. Brown, 785 P.2d 790, 796 (Or.
1990) (Riggs, J:, concurring) ("It may be that the test of 'compelling circumstances' is as slippery
a concept and as difficult to define in a given case as any of the other tests that have been
proffered from time to time .... ").
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that may generate evidence resulting in criminal or civil liability. As
long as this dilemma remains in effect, the Commission's objective of
promoting internal compliance programs will be frustrated.
Notwithstanding Sentencing Guideline inducements, few companies
will establish comprehensive compliance programs without adequate
assurance of protection for confidential materials.203 To remedy this
situation, some proponents of effective compliance programs have
suggested that immunity ought to be conferred upon companies that
establish such programs.20 4
203. Because o'f the Sentencing Guidelines, the number of companies that maintain com-
pliance programs may not decrease. Without further protection for compliance materials,
however, the quality of these programs is likely to suffer. Businesses will commit fewer re-
sources to compliance programs and their efforts will become superficial and inconsistent.
When companies lack a shield for compliance materials, they examine fewer internal activities,
undertake fewer types of investigations, translate fewer findings into corrective plans, and
retain analysis for a shorter period. See O'Reilly, 19 Seton Hall Legis. J. at 119 (cited in note
12).
204. See Joseph E. Murphy, Moving Towards Immunity, 4 Corp. Conduct Q. 18 (1994).
Two of the most eloquent advocates of immunity legislation, Jay A. Sigler and Joseph E.
Murphy, have argued that "[i]n order to protect [and promote] self-evaluation the necessary tool
is an ... absolute self-evaluative privilege." Sigler and Murphy, Interactive Corporate
Compliance at 158 (cited in note 12). Sigler and Murphy attempted to break from the
regulation/deregulation paradigm by proposing a third alternative, an approach they call
interactive corporate compliance. Under this approach, a corporation may protect its
compliance materials if it conducts a program which has been "certified" by the administrative
agency responsible for that area of the law. Id. at 149.
Whether a program qualifies for certification depends on minimum standards designed by
corporate personnel and government officials from the relevant federal agencies. Those corpo-
rations not meeting the certification requirements "would be subject to the provisions and
penalties of the law as they currently exist." Id. If a program meets the requirements and is
"certified," however, the corporation could be rewarded for its diligence. For example, the
corporation might be relieved of some of its reporting or consent decree requirements. Id. at
151. In addition, the certified corporation might receive a preference when bidding for govern-
ment contracts or could qualify for tax advantages. Id. These suggestions merit careful consid-
eration. At first glance, the most problematic aspect of this approach stems from the fact that
not all businesses are regulated by federal agencies. Consequently, in many instances, interac-
tive compliance will not be realistic. Furthermore, few businesses would welcome the creation
of an ongoing relationship with the federal government that may produce a constant federal
presence on the premises.
Sigler and Murphy's most troubling proposal, however, arises from their discussion of
criminal and civil liability for certified corporations. They propose that a certified company be
free from criminal prosecution and liability unless the government can show that "the corpora-
tion had subverted the compliance process." Id. at 152. In that case the company would be
liable not only for the criminal violation but also for the new crime of subverting the compliance
process, a crime treated much like obstruction of justice. Id. Sigler and Murphy further state
that, if Congress insists upon making companies strictly liable for some crimes, penalties for
those crimes would be mitigated by evidence of a certified program. Id. at 153.
Sigler and Murphy also suggest that certified companies should be immune from suits
brought by "private attorney[s]- general" Id. at 153-54. Civil damages against a certified corpo-
ration would be limited to actual damages; treble damages, attorneys fees, and punitive dam-
ages would not be allowed.
Though Sigler and Murphy's ideas are innovative, several problems arise from their ap-
proach. For example, by requiring that federal agencies certify the program, businesses may be
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Compliance immunity would certainly grant corporate citizens
the necessary protection to promote comprehensive and effective
compliance efforts. In the criminal justice system, immunity grants
are often conferred to compel testimony from recalcitrant witnesses
who might otherwise rely upon their fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to remain silent. The immunity grant
displaces the fifth amendment privilege by providing the witness with
comparable protections.205 Depending upon the type of immunity
employed, the witness receives either complete protection from
prosecution (transactional immunity) or a guarantee that neither his
testimony nor anything derived therefrom will be used against him at
trial (use immunity).206
placed in the awkward position of trying to meet the conflicting demands of multiple agencies.
Assuming that these demands could be met, the regulatory overkill may result in a
bloated-and expensive-compliance program. In addition, this approach assumes that a
regulatory agency exists for every area of business that faces compliance issues. This is not
always the case. Some businesses, for example, are self regulating and do not have a federal
agency from which to seek certification for compliance programs.
Furthermore, in many cases this approach removes a plaintiffs incentive to bring an action
for injury caused by a certified corporation. By limiting damages to actual damages, many
plaintiffs will never be fully compensated for their injury as a substantial portion of their dam-
age award will go towards their attorney fees, court costs, and related expenses. Michael
Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 827, 835 (1987)
(arguing that damages do little to deter illegal conduct).
In addition, the Sigler and Murphy proposal fails to indicate who will receive the immunity.
Will the company alone be protected, or will the protection extend to employees? If only the
company is immune from prosecution, the employees are unlikely to support the program,
perhaps even withholding information at times for their own protection.
Finally, compliance programs may be encouraged with a narrower approach to immunity.
The Sigler and Murphy proposal allows transactional immunity from criminal prosecution for a
"reasonable" program; however, the existence of a "reasonable" compliance program, standing
alone, will not always negate the existence of mens rea under traditional principles of vicarious
liability in criminal cases. See generally Brickey, 1 Corporate Criminal Liability § 4:02 (cited in
note 57) (stating that the corporation may be vicariously liable for the acts of employees done
within the scope of their employment and with intent to benefit the corporation); Wayne R.
LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 3.10(c) (West, 2d ed. 1986) (same). Therefore,
reasonableness, standing alone, is not a defense to vicarious liability. See generally Richard S.
Gruner and Louis M. Brown, Organizational Justice: Recognizing and Rewarding the Good
Citizen Corporation, 21 J. Corp. L. (1996) (forthcoming publication). By providing for
transactional immunity, Sigler and Murphy potentially allow every compliance-certified
company to commit at least one free crime (upon which, presumably, the program might be
decertified). This approach is contrary to traditional immunity principles, which never absolve
crimes before they are committed. Compare United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 121-27
(1980) (ruling that immunized testimony may be admissible in a subsequent perjury
prosecution).
205. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449-54 (1972) (holding that use immunity
"is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination"); Goldberg v. United
States, 472 F.2d 513, 516 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[W]e must accept the Court's confidence that use and
derivative use immunity will in fact prove to be coextensive with the privilege against self-
incrimination.").
206. See Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 8.11(b) at 394-97
(West, 2d ed. 1996). Under federal law, immunized witnesses receive use immunity. 18 U.S.C.
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Although immunity grants often allow criminals to escape
prosecution, Congress and most state legislatures have enacted
immunity provisions because of the need to compel crucial witnesses
to cooperate with government prosecutors. Absent such protections,
recalcitrant witnesses often lack any incentive to testify.20 7 Because
statutory immunity procedures allow testimony to be induced,20 8 they
have often been instrumental in complex white-collar investigations
and successful organized crime prosecutions. 209
Notwithstanding these successes, the potential application of
use immunity to compliance program materials has raised some con-
cerns. For example, critics contend that immunity legislation offers
corporations a privilege against self-incrimination similar to the Fifth
Amendment. Under traditional legal doctrine, however, corporations
are not protected by the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination.2 10 Opponents of immunity also assert that protection
for evaluative materials often precludes actions against an outlaw
corporation. They contend that, because the corporation is privy to
information not available to others, prosecutors and plaintiffs will be
disadvantaged when they are unable to obtain such evidence.211
Finally, some argue that the added cost and burden of obtaining
§ 6001 et seq. (1994 ed.). By comparison, some states confer transactional immunity. See
Kenneth J. Melilli, Exclusion of Evidence in Federal Prosecutions on the Basis of State Law, 22
Ga. L. Rev. 667, 684 n.96 (1988) (noting that some state constitutions may be "more demanding"
than the federal privilege against self-incrimination); Jerold H. Israel, On Recognizing
Variations in State Criminal Procedure, 15 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 465, 477 (1982) (noting that
Michigan retained transactional immunity after Kastigar).
207. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 447 (finding immunity statutes "essential to the effective
enforcement of various criminal statutes"); Ronald Goldstock and Dan T. Coenen, Controlling
the Contemporary Loanshark: The Law of Illicit Lending and the Problem of Witness Fear, 65
Cornell L. Rev. 127 (1980) (providing historical overview emphasizing importance of immunity
in organized crime cases). In a fifth amendment context, once a witness has been immunized,
his testimony may be compelled through the threat of contempt sanctions.
208. See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 290 n.11 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing the practice of using immunity to induce testimony); United States v. Brookins, 614
F.2d 1037, 1043 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that testimony was partially induced by a grant of
immunity).
209. See James Hamilton, The Power to Probe 78 (Random House, 1976); Kristine
Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 791 (1978); John Van
Loben Sels, Note, From Watergate to Whitewater: Congressional Use Immunity and Its Impact
on the Independent Counsel, 83 Geo. L. J. 2385 (1995).
210. See, for example, Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974) (finding that
"privilege ... should be 'limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual
from compulsory incrimination' "); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-700 (1944) (finding
that privilege is purely personal and does not apply to corporations or other organizations).
211. See Arlen, Nat'l L. J. at A23 (cited in note 172). See also Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia
Co., 53 F.R.D. 283, 285 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (allowing plaintiff access to "factual or statistical
information that was available" to the defendant during defendant's evaluation); Mergentime
Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transportation Authority, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11080
at *10 (D.D.C.) (adopting a "very narrow definition" of the self-evaluative privilege).
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closely held information undermines the efficiency of our justice
system.212
Such arguments are misplaced and myopic. Although business
entities are not protected by the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self incrimination,213 they ought not be required to maintain compli-
ance programs that build a prosecutor's or plaintiffs case. Few
businesses could survive the litigation-consciousness that such a
requirement would foster.
Further, an intermediate mechanism exists that strikes an
appropriate balance between the desire for effective law enforcement
and the need to protect confidential compliance materials: providing
limited use immunity for qualified materials generated by an effective
compliance program. In contrast to transactional immunity, use im-
munity does not confer complete protection from prosecution. Rather,
such immunity merely precludes the declarant's evidence--or
anything derived therefrom-from being used against the declarant in
a subsequent prosecution. 214 The premise for use immunity under the
Fifth Amendment is that the witness is placed in the same position
that he would have occupied had he not made an incriminating state-
ment.215 Therefore, the privilege against self-incrimination remains
intact. Because the witness is still subject to possible prosecution,
however, he receives no windfall benefits under such an immunity
grant.216
This theory also makes sense in the corporate compliance
context. Use immunity operates effectively in the federal criminal
justice system to induce recalcitrant witnesses to testify. Equivalent
protection for compliance materials can be expected to induce busi-
nesses to establish internal compliance programs. Transactional
immunity might provide a better incentive for businesses to establish
compliance programs, but transactional immunity goes too far by
producing windfall protections. 217 Further, the incentives provided by
212. Bush, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 634-37 (cited in note 5).
213. See note 210.
214. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 448-53.
215. Id. at 452-53, 458-59.
216. See id. at 453 (stating that the privilege "has never been construed to mean that one
who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted").
217. In Kastigar, the Supreme Court observed:
While a grant of immunity must afford protection commensurate with that afforded by
the privilege, it need not be broader. Transactional immunity, which affords full im-
munity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, af-





use immunity should be sufficient, especially since they would be
complemented by the Sentencing Guidelines "carrot and stick"
approach to internal compliance. 218
The Sentencing Guidelines also provide an excellent founda-
tional context for this approach: to be eligible for use immunity, the
company would need to demonstrate that it has established an
"effective" compliance program as defined by the Guidelines.219
Absent this threshold, the immunity would not apply.
Finally, under a use immunity approach, neither the govern-
ment nor private plaintiffs would be prejudiced by the grant of such
immunity. This is because use immunity merely places the company
in the same position it would have occupied had no internal investiga-
tion been conducted.220 Accordingly, the company may still be prose-
cuted or civilly sued, but no compliance materials-or anything
derived therefrom-would be admissible in such actions. As with the
federal use immunity statute, the profferring party would need to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that proffered materials
are independent of an immunized source. 22'
V. CONCLUSION
Internal compliance programs have become a central compo-
nent of good corporate citizenship. Good corporate citizens, however,
ought not be placed in the dilemma of choosing between effective
internal compliance and the liability risks attendant to full disclosure.
Thus far, judicial and legislative efforts to eliminate this dilemma
have proven inadequate. Fortunately, the dilemma may be resolved
by enacting federal legislation that confers use immunity upon com-
pliance materials produced by programs that meet the due diligence
218. See note 78 and accompanying text.
219. See notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
220. As the Supreme Court noted in Jaffee v. Redmond:
Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which litigants... seek
access-for example, admissions against interest by a party-is unlikely to come into
being. This unspoken "evidence" will therefore serve no greater truth-seeking function
than if it had been spoken and privileged.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 (1996).
221. In other words, the evidence must show that they do not stem from protected compli-
ance materials. Compare United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 866-868 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(remanding conviction of Oliver North for district court determination of whether prosecution
improperly used immunized testimony). Although such immunity may increase investigative
and litigation costs to opposing parties, these costs would be offset by the social and economic
benefits stemming from effective internal compliance programs. Similar utilitarian considera-
tions apply under the federal use immunity statute in criminal cases.
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requirements of the Sentencing Guidelines. A model immunity
statute reflecting this approach is set forth in the Appendix to this
Article. Until such an immunity procedure is established, the
dilemma posed by internal compliance programs will remain, and
some good deeds will continue to be punished.222






(a) "Eligible compliance program" means an
institutionalized internal review program that meets the
requirements contained in Chapter Eight of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. 223
(b) "Compliance program materials" means a set of
documents or other materials prepared during the course of an
eligible compliance program. Compliance program materials include
the following: compliance audit results, field notes and records of
observations, training materials, opinions, suggestions, conclusions,
drafts, memoranda, drawings, photographs, computer-generated or
electronically recorded information, maps, charts, graphs, and
surveys.
(c) "Compliance report" means a document that is prepared
pursuant to an eligible compliance program and that sets forth partial
or complete results of a compliance investigation.
Section II: Immunity for Compliance Program Materials
(a) Pursuant to authorization by the principals of any
business entity, any individual within high-level management of a
business organization224 may petition a federal district court for use
immunity as defined in subsection (d) of this Section.
(b) In deciding whether to grant the requested immunity,
the court may appoint a private inspector general225 to help determine
223. See Part II.B.
224. See USSG § 8A1.2 comment. (3(k)(2)) (stating that individuals within high-level
personnel of organizations must be assigned to oversee compliance).
225. See generally Ronald M. Goldstock, Remarks at United States Sentencing Commission
Symposium, Corporate Crime in America; Strengthening the "Good Citizen" Corporation,
Washington, D.C., Sept. 7-8 (1995) (transcript on file with the Authors) (describing the use of
Independent Private Sector Inspector Generals); Thomas D. Thatcher II, Combatting
Corruption and Racketeering: A New Strategy for Reforming Public Contracting in New York
City's Construction Industry, 40 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 113, 134-35 (1995) (discussing corporate
use of an Independent Private Sector Inspector General). See also Margaret J. Gates and
Marjorie Fine Knowles, The Inspector General Act in the Federal Government: A New Approach




whether the company has established an eligible compliance program.
The company shall bear all costs associated with this private
inspector general.
(c) Upon finding that a company has established an eligible
compliance program, the court shall issue an immunity order
protecting specified compliance materials from use in subsequent
litigation.
(d) No information arising from protected compliance
materials (nor any evidence derived from such materials) may be used
against the petitioner in a civil or criminal case, except in a
prosecution for perjury or giving a false statement.
(e) Nothing in this section should be construed to limit use
of information contained in the protected materials if the proponent
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the information
was obtained from an independent source. 26
(f) Upon finding that a company has not established an
eligible compliance program, the court shall return the materials to
the company with an order declaring the materials unprotected.
Absent a compelling public interest, the court shall not release the
unprotected materials to any other individual or entity.
226. See United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1082 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that the
government must prove that the evidence was "derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony") (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460); United States v.
Frumento, 552 F.2d 534, 542 (3d Cir. 1977) (finding that the government must meet a heavy
burden by showing that evidence was derived from sources other than the immunized
defendant's testimony)).
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